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ABSTRACT

The Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB)
established that financial reports of governmental entities
should assist users in assessing accountability of
politicians and bureaucracies (GASB 1987, 100.103).
Auditing standards promulgated for the governmental
environment similarly emphasize administrative
accountability to the public.
Government Auditing Standards (GAS) require auditors
to determine whether a governmental entity has complied
with all applicable laws and regulations.

If noncompliance

is found to have a material effect on the financial
statements, governmental auditors are required to report
it.

This study examined what level of reporting auditors

use and what factors contribute to a lack of consensus in
reporting decisions.
Specifically, auditor reporting decisions concerning
municipal compliance with the Louisiana Local Government
Budget Act were investigated.

The Budget Act requires

municipalities to amend their budgets if actual
expenditures will exceed the budget by more than five
percent.

Auditors experienced in governmental auditing

participated in an experiment, involving a small
municipality that had contracted for an audit in accordance

vii
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with GAS.

Subjects were asked where they would report

noncoinpliance with the Budget Act.
Four independent variables were hypothesized to have
an impact on reporting decisions:

unfavorable budget

variance, fiscal stress, political turnover, and employment
sector of the auditor.

Data were analyzed with chi-square

tests, ordinal probit analysis, and correlation statistics.
Budget variance and employment sector of the auditor
were found to affect reporting decisions.

Neither fiscal

stress nor political turnover was significant, however.
Auditors working for the Legislative Auditor of the State
of Louisiana reported all instances of noncompliance at the
maximum disclosure level, the Compliance Report.

Auditors

employed in the private sector, however, apparently judged
the materiality of noncompliance.

When budget variance was

sixteen percent, private sector auditors, like legislative
auditors, reported noncompliance in the compliance report.
However, when budget variance was seven percent, private
practitioners chose lower levels of disclosure, such as
footnotes or a management letter.

Finally, legislative

auditors demonstrated higher consensus than private
practitioners.

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Considerable research has investigated auditors'
reporting decisions in the private sector (e.g. Holstrum &
Messier,

1982; Messier, 1983; Krogstad, Ettenson, &

Shanteau, 1984; and Chewning, Pany, & Wheeler, 1989),
concentrating, for the most part, on materiality thresholds
and auditor-client conflict.

Private sector research may

not be directly comparable to the public sector, however,
as reporting decisions in governmental auditing differ from
reporting decisions in private sector auditing for a
variety of reasons.

Icerman and Hillison (1989) pointed

out that governmental auditors have stewardship
responsibilities beyond those to investors, such as
bondholders; they also have responsibilities to involuntary
resource providers who are not constituents and to
non-providers who receive government services.
Financial reports provide vital evidence in
demonstrating governmental accountability.

The

Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) prescribes
that financial reports should enable governmental agencies
or political subdivisions to demonstrate public
accountability and should assist users in assessing the
level of administrative accountability (GASB, 1987,
100.103) .
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The additional stewardship responsibilities of the
governmental auditor are reflected in the standards for
governmental audits.

Standards for a financial audit of a

governmental agency fall into three categories:

Generally

Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS), Government Auditing
Standards (GAS), and Single Audits.

Fieldwork standards

among the three categories are essentially the same; the
differences are found primarily in the reporting
requirements.

Under GAAS, the only report required is an

opinion on the financial statements.

GAS audits encompass

GAAS reporting requirements, but supplemental reports
concerning internal controls and compliance with laws and
regulations are also required.

Finally, Single Audits

require an additional schedule of findings and questioned
costs and, if the entity receives federal financial
assistance that qualifies as a major program, an opinion on
compliance.1 The increased reporting required by each
successive set of standards is illustrated in Figure 1.1.
In the state of Louisiana, municipalities are required
by law to submit audited financial statements to the Office
of the Legislative Auditor on an annual or biannual basis,
depending on the size of their budgets.

These financial

1 The Single Audit Act outlines a sliding scale which
determines whether federal assistance constitutes a major
program.
This schedule is contained in the Glossary of
Statement on Auditing Standards 68: Compliance Auditing
Applicable to Governmental Entities and Other Recipients of
Governmental Financial Assistance (AICPA, 1992).
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SINGLE AUDIT
Reports Issued
Major Programs; Opinion on compliance,
schedule of findings and questioned costs, and
report on compliance with general requirements
Minor Programs; Statement of positive
assurance about nonmajor federal financial
assistance program transactions tested and
negative assurance about transactions not
tested;
schedule of findings and questioned
costs

GOVERNMENT AUDITING STANDARDS
Reports Issued
Statement of positive assurance about
transactions tested and negative assurance
about transactions not tested;
report of
material instances of noncompliance found

GENERALLY ACCEPTED AUDITING STANDARDS
Report Issued
Opinion on financial statements

Figure 1.1
Reports Required under Various Auditing Standards
(Adapted from American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 63:
Compliance Auditing Applicable to Governmental Entities and
Other Recipients of Governmental Financial Assistance.
New
York: American Institute of Certified Public Accountants,
1989.)

audits are to be conducted under GAS unless they are
subject to Single Audit guidelines.

Because few

municipalities in the state receive sufficient federal
funds to fall under the Single Audit Act, the majority
engage auditors for GAS audits.
Government Auditing Standards require auditors to
determine whether the entity has complied with laws and
regulations.

If an auditor determines that noncompliance

has occurred, he or she must consider which of the
available reporting options is appropriate.

This study

investigates auditor reporting decisions concerning
compliance with the Louisiana Local Government Budget Act
(hereafter the Budget Act), in performing municipal audits
under GAS.

Because the budget is a fundamental part of any

government's financial reporting,2 it provides a broadly
relevant setting for studying auditors' compliance
reporting decisions.
According to GAS, auditors must report noncompliance
with laws and regulations if noncompliance has a material
effect on the financial statements.

The materiality of

noncompliance with the Budget Act is not clear cut;
although the municipality may be sued for injunctive relief
2 Generally accepted accounting principles for
governmental entities require that "the minimum budget
basis presentation within the general purpose financial
statements is the aggregation of the appropriated budgets
[for revenues and expenditures], as amended, compared to
related actuals." (Governmental Accounting Standards Board,
1987, 2400.102)

(LSA-RS 39:1314), it is not liable for refund or loss of
state grants or other aid received if it violates the
Budget Act.

Over-spending is, technically, an illegal act;

the auditor may consider it significant and subject to some
level of disclosure (AICPA, 1988) .

It may also be

appropriate to report violations of the budget because
users of the financial statements expect certain types of
findings to be reported, and public perceptions are clearly
involved in budget related activity.
This study explores the reporting practices of
governmental auditors.

Specifically, the reporting

practices of different groups of governmental auditors
faced with noncompliance with the Budget Act in varying
contexts are examined.

The degree of budget variance,

fiscal stress, political turnover, and employment sector of
the auditor are hypothesized to impact compliance reporting
decisions.

In the following section, background

information concerning GAS and auditor independence is
discussed, followed by development of this study.

BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM
Government Auditing Standards
Because most of the resources used to pay for
governmental operating activities are provided
involuntarily through various taxes, a need to assure
accountability in administering those resources exists.

Hence, government agencies and political subdivisions must
be audited for compliance with laws and regulations
regarding expenditures and administration of government
programs.

SAS No. 68, Compliance Auditing Applicable to

Governmental Entities and Other Recipients of Governmental
Financial Assistance, which is concerned with GAAS, GAS,
and Single Audits, requires that,
the auditor should obtain an understanding of the
possible effects on financial statements of laws
and regulations that are generally recognized by
auditors to have a direct and material effect on
the determination of amounts in a governmental
entity's financial statements (AICPA, 1992, par.
1 1 ).
Auditors engaged to perform an audit in accordance
with GAS, however, have additional responsibilities beyond
those in a GAAS audit.3

The U. S. General Accounting

Office (GAO) states that primary among those
responsibilities is the requirement that the auditor
prepare a report on compliance with laws and regulations
(GAO, 1988, 5-2, par. 5).

The statement on compliance is

considered significant because government organizations are

3 GAS are outlined in the Standards for Audits of
Governmental Organizations. Programs. Activities, and
Functions, promulgated by the U.S. General Accounting
Office.
In practice, GAS are often referred to as
Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards (GAGAS) or
the "Yellow Book." The "Yellow Book" incorporates
standards for financial audits and performance audits, but
for the purposes of this study, GAS will refer only to the
standards for financial audits.

created by law and generally must follow more specific
rules and regulations than private entities (GAO, 1985).
In a GAS audit, the report on compliance may be
included within the opinion on the financial statements or
in a separate report.

This report must contain positive

assurance on those items that were tested for compliance as
well as negative assurance on those items not tested.
All instances of noncompliance with laws and
regulations that are material to the groups of accounts
being audited should be reported.

Material noncompliance

also includes instances that individually are not material
but when aggregated may have a material effect.

If the

compilation of immaterial items of noncompliance is still
immaterial, the items may be disclosed separately in
written or oral communication to the management of the
entity and should not affect the audit opinion (GAO, 1988,
5-2 - 5-3, pars. 5 - 8 ) .
Materiality is an inherently subjective judgment for
the auditor.

This may be especially true when an auditor

is making a joint judgment of how noncompliance is
translated into a dollar impact and whether that impact is
material to the financial statements.

This subjectivity,

as well as the increased disclosure options in a GAS audit,
may lead to diverse reporting practices.
Nondisclosure of noncompliance when present,
therefore, may signal a number of underlying conditions.

The auditor may not have detected the noncompliance.

If

the noncompliance was detected but not reported, the
auditor may have either determined that it was not material
or may have chosen to communicate privately to the client,
via oral communication or management letter.

In any of

these cases, if an outside observer believes that public
disclosure was warranted, the auditor's performance may be
questioned.

Reports on Governmental Audit Quality
In response to growing public concern in the early
1980s over waste and mismanagement of federal funds, the U.
S. Congress directed more attention to compliance issues
within grantee agencies.

In July, 1984, at the request of

Congress, the GAO reviewed audits for 46 regional offices
of seven Inspectors General.

These audits covered agencies

administering 95 percent of all domestic federal
assistance.
For the purposes of the GAO study, audit quality was
defined as "compliance with professional standards set out
for the particular type of audit considered"
8).

(GAO, 1985,

Audits were selected for the GAO study based on prior

regional inspectors' general experience with the audit
firms, results of routine desk reviews performed for each
audit, and whether or not the audit firm had previously
been contracted for agency audits.

The results of these studies revealed that, in the
judgment of the GAO, 34 percent of the audits were not
performed in compliance with professional standards.
Problems concerning failure to report noncompliance were
found in 25 percent of the reports reviewed, and one in
five reviewed revealed a failure to perform a majority of
the required audit work in a major segment of the audit.
The reviewers found unexplained inaccuracies, missing
schedules,

inadequate descriptions of the audit scope, and

insufficient documentation.

The two predominant problems

were related to compliance and internal control.
sample of audits reviewed,

Of the

12.5 percent had problems

identifying noncompliance with laws and regulations.
addition,

In

insufficient evidence was a frequent problem,

especially evidence associated with compliance issues (GAO,
1985).

It is important to note, however, that audits for

the GAO quality review studies were not selected at random,
so the proportion of audits of poor quality may have been
overstated.
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(AICPA) responded to the findings of the GAO regarding
audit quality by establishing a task force to study the
problem.

In 1987, it released the Report of the Task Force

on the Quality of Audits of Governmental Units.

This

report (dubbed "The Five E's") contained recommendations to
improve public sector audit quality.

The five categories

of recommendations focused on education, engagement of
auditors, evaluation of audit quality, enforcement of
standards, and exchange of information (AICPA, 1987).

In

addition, the AICPA increased the emphasis on governmental
accounting and auditing in the Uniform CPA Examination.
Governmental auditing has been added to the content
specification for the auditing section of the exam, and in
the new format to be used beginning in 1994, governmental
accounting will constitute 30 percent of the financial
accounting and reporting section.
Compliance reporting has been cited as a problem area
by both the AICPA and the GAO.

However, the AICPA

recommendations and the accounting literature provide
neither insight nor the results of research into the manner
in which compliance reporting decisions are made.

The

AICPA task force recommendations provided general solutions
to improve governmental audit quality, but they did not
specifically address compliance reporting practices or
provide guidance for materiality judgments.

Further,

research into reporting decisions has focused on the
private sector, where compliance reports are absent, and
research in governmental accounting and auditing has
largely ignored the compliance issue altogether.
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AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE
Reporting decisions are dependent on two sometimes
conflicting goals of the auditor:

1) maintaining auditor

independence and professional integrity, and 2) retaining
the client (Goldman & Bariev, 1974).

If a municipality or

other auditee is in compliance with all applicable laws and
regulations, the auditor can meet both these goals
simultaneously by issuing an unqualified opinion and a
clean compliance report.4

However, if the auditee is not

in compliance with applicable laws, and the auditee resists
disclosure, conflict may result.

Questions of disclosure

in situations of conflict have been considered from the
perspective of auditor independence in prior audit research
(e.g., Shockley, 1981; Knapp, 1985, 1987).
Auditor independence is considered the foundation of
the auditing profession (Littleton, 1965).

Independence

has to do with the individual auditor maintaining a proper
attitude in three aspects of the audit:

planning,

performance of procedures, and preparation of the report
(Mautz and Sharaf, 1961).
reporting,

Elaborating on independence in

Mautz and Sharaf (1961) stated that the auditor

must avoid "excluding significant matters from the formal
report in favor of their inclusion in an informal report of
any kind"

(207).

4 For the purposes of this study, it is assumed that
the financial account balances have been found to be
presented fairly.
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DeAngelo (1981b) said that perfect auditor
independence occurs when the conditional probability that
the auditor will report a discovered breach if a breach is
found is equal to one.

She added that, "the greater the

incentive for the auditor to tell the truth, the greater
the value of the auditor's opinion"

(116).

The competitive

nature of the auditing business has the potential to lead
to less than perfect auditor independence.

Goldman and

Bariev (1974, 707) pointed out that "the threat to
independence is built into the structure of this
professional role and that pressures not to perform
according to professional standards are constantly
created."
Competition among audit firms for a given client
sometimes leads audit firms to bid low, even below cost, in
the initial engagement.

In subsequent engagements by the

same client, the audit firm will earn economic quasi-rents
due to technological advantages the incumbent auditor
enjoys and costs to the client of changing auditors
(DeAngelo, 1981b).

Termination of the auditor-client

relationship is costly to both parties, in that the auditor
loses quasi-rents and the client bears start-up costs
associated with a new auditor.

Therefore, significant

incentives exist for both parties to maintain the
professional relationship.

These incentives make the

auditor more susceptible to client pressure not to disclose

13

a breach; conversely, the lower costs involved for the
client if the incumbent auditor is retained may make the
client less inclined to terminate the relationship over a
disclosure disagreement (DeAngelo, 1981b).
Compromises of audit quality for the purposes of
client retention also pose potential costs to the auditor.
Should the reporting decision be questioned, the
professional integrity of the auditor may be affected by
sanctions, the auditor may suffer the loss of reputation
and clientele, and legal liabilities may result (Shockley,
1982) .

Therefore, auditors with a large client base are

likely to lose more by failing to report a breach than by
losing a particular series of client-specific quasi-rents
(DeAngelo, 1981c).
A substantial portion of municipal audits, however,
are conducted by small audit firms.

For such firms, the

fee from one governmental client could be a large
proportion of revenues, giving rise to the possibility that
the loss of a particular client could have a significant
impact on the audit firm.

Municipalities are also not

necessarily subject to the market pressures that demand
high quality audits.

Governmental audits have

traditionally posed a lower business risk for audit firms;
litigation is less likely and sanctions have been less
common until recently (GAO, 1986; AICPA, 1987).
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In recent years, however, peer review and quality
assurance programs have increased the probability that
disclosure decisions will come under scrutiny.

Every

audited set of financial statements submitted to the Office
of the Legislative Auditor of Louisiana receives a quality
assurance review.

However, compliance reporting decisions

concerning significant but non-material items, such as
violations of the Budget Act, are rarely scrutinized
(Austin, personal communication, 1991).

A sample of

governmental audits also undergoes a full desk review by
the Society of Louisiana Certified Public Accountants,
where more attention is given to reporting treatment of
such items.
The Legislative Auditor must approve all municipal
audit engagements, thus repeated findings of questionable
reporting decisions may impair an auditor's ability to
maintain a governmental audit practice.

Although potential

legal liability in a municipal audit is fairly low and
minimizes business risk for the auditor, the possibility of
being prohibited from conducting future governmental
engagements increases the business risk in making
questionable reporting decisions strictly to keep a
specific client.

Further, DeAngelo (1981a) noted that if

an auditor gains industry-specific knowledge in the course
of an audit, then that knowledge carries over to other
clients in the same industry, mitigating the losses

associated with losing one specific client.

The opposing

forces of small firm size and industry specialization, as
well as low litigation risk and increasing scrutiny, make
it unclear how susceptible municipal auditors may be to
pressures to underreport noncompliance.

COMPLIANCE REPORTING OPTIONS
Upon discovery of a governmental client's failure to
comply with applicable laws and regulations, the auditor
must consider some level of disclosure.

Several options

exist for reporting noncompliance, ranging from oral
communication to the compliance report.
First, for noncompliance considered nonmaterial,
reporting standards for financial audits state that,
"nonmaterial instances of noncompliance need not be
disclosed in the compliance report but should be reported
in a separate communication to the audited entity,
preferably in writing"

(GAO, 1988, 5-3, par 8).

This

standard provides the auditor with a choice of discussing
noncompliance orally with the auditee or addressing it in a
management letter.

A management letter could reasonably be

considered to be higher level reporting than oral
communication, however, especially in the governmental
context, because many written documents that might remain
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confidential in the private sector become part of the
public record.5
The next higher level of reporting available to the
auditor is disclosure of noncompliance in the footnotes to
the financial statements.

Although GAS do not specify the

role of footnotes in noncompliance reporting, footnotes
have traditionally been used to disclose items not
significant enough to include directly in the financial
statements or the auditor's report but too significant to
omit from the financial statements altogether.

Footnote

disclosure can be considered a higher level of reporting
than the management letter because they are part of the
publicly disseminated financial statements.

Conversely,

the footnotes can be considered a lower level of disclosure
than the reports, as the reports tend to highlight
instances of noncompliance.
Finally, if the auditor deems noncompliance to be
material relative to the financial statements, the
noncompliance should be reported in the compliance report

5 When a municipality in Louisiana engages an
independent auditor, the Legislative Auditor must approve
the engagement.
The standard letter sent by the
Legislative Auditor contains the stipulation that copies of
all management letters are to be sent to the Legislative
Auditor along with the annual report.
Therefore, although
the management letter is not publicly disseminated with the
annual report, it is part of the public record available to
interested parties requesting information from the
Legislative Auditor.
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(GAO, 1988, 5-3).

Specifically, paragraph 5 of the

reporting standards states:
The auditors should prepare a written report on
their tests of compliance with applicable laws
and regulations.
This report, which may be
included in either the report on the financial
audit or a separate report . . . should include
all material instances of noncompliance. . .(GAO,
1988, 5-2; emphasis added).
Auditing standards do not specify a disclosure
hierarchy between the compliance report and the opinion on
the financial statements.

By permitting the report on

noncompliance to be either a part of the opinion or a
separate document, the standards imply that the opinion and
the compliance report are equal in stature.6

Whether

noncompliance is reported in the footnotes, the compliance
report, or the opinion, it is made part of the report
readily available to third parties, making each a form of
public disclosure.
It is possible that audit clients perceive a
difference in the level of reporting if noncompliance is
disclosed in the compliance report rather than the opinion.
If so, the auditor may be able to satisfy a client in a
conflict situation by reporting noncompliance in the

6 This interpretation was supported in a conversation
with William Anderson, Jr., Project Manager at the GAO.
According to Mr. Anderson, in the opinion of the GAO, the
opinion on the financial statements, the compliance report,
and the report on internal controls are equal and integral
parts of the auditor's report.

18

compliance report rather than the opinion because the
opinion is likely to be considered the highest level of
disclosure.

This is strictly conjecture, however, and

therefore no hierarchical differentiation is assumed for
the purposes of this study.

The Louisiana Local Government Budget Act
Any municipality is subject to numerous federal,
state, and local laws and regulations that may affect the
financial statements.

In the state of Louisiana, one law

applicable to each municipality is the Louisiana Local
Government Budget Act (LSA-RS 39:1301-1314).

For local

governments, the budget is perhaps the most significant
document, in that it drives government activities and
provides a standard for accountability (Ives, 1985).
Therefore, because this law applies to each municipality,
and the budget is central to the accounting process in a
governmental entity, this study investigates auditors'
compliance reporting decisions involving municipal
compliance with the Budget Act.
The Budget Act requires each political subdivision in
Louisiana to adopt an annual budget before the beginning of
the fiscal year.

When there is a change in operations

during the fiscal year such that public expenditures will
exceed the original budget by more than five percent, the
Budget Act requires that the budget be amended.

Exceeding
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the budget is fairly common.

Baron (1989) found that,

among a sample of towns in New Mexico, 34 percent exceeded
the budget.

Of a sample of 100 municipalities in Louisiana

studied in the development of this project, 68 exceeded the
budget for expenditures, 40 by five percent or more.
Because Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
(GAAP) require the minimum budget presentation for
governmental entities to include comparisons of the
appropriated budgets to related actual revenues and
expenditures (GASB, 1987, 2400.103), the dollar variance
from the budget will be disclosed in audited financial
statements.7

However, if the budget for expenditures, as

amended, is exceeded by more than five percent, the
municipality is in violation of the Budget Act.

In such

cases, the level of disclosure of noncompliance with the
law becomes an issue to the auditor.
Depending on the professional judgment of the auditor,
the violation may be disclosed publicly in the footnotes,
the compliance report, or the audit opinion.

However,

if

the auditor believes that the presentation of the budget
variance in the financial statements is sufficient, or if
the noncompliance is judged not to be material or
7 In the state of Louisiana, political subdivisions
are required to submit financial reports that conform to
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), and that
have been audited under GAS on a periodic basis (LSA-RS
24:517).
If an entity is a recipient of at least $100,000
of federal financial assistance, however, the audit must be
performed under Single Audit guidelines, under federal law.
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significant, he or she may decide that private disclosure,
such as a management letter or oral communication, would
suffice.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The more material the auditor considers the violation,
the higher order of disclosure it should receive, ceteris
paribus (Boatsman & Robertson,

1974).

But because there is

some flexibility in the reporting decision, compliance may
be an area where an auditor is more likely to encounter
client pressure to minimize disclosure or to issue an
inappropriate report (Nichols & Price, 1976; Goldman &
Bariev, 1974).

Speaking to this point, Mautz and Sharaf

(1961, 218) noted the difficulty of maintaining auditor
independence:
Certainly some practitioners are strong enough to
resist any temptation and any pressure that may
be brought to bear on their independence.
And
just as certainly other practitioners find real
independence a little more than they can manage
in the face of considerable pressure and under
the conditions of professional practice.
Knapp (1987) found that audit committees will be less
likely to support the auditor in a conflict with the client
when reporting flexibility exists, and financial statement
users perceive that the auditor will be less likely to
withstand auditor pressure (Knapp, 1985).

The reporting

decision in a flexible situation, such as one where

21

materiality is not clearly defined and where multiple
public and private reporting options are available, may
therefore reflect the auditor's balance between the two
goals of client retention and maintaining independence.
Independence issues in municipal audits have not been
examined in the accounting literature.

However, impairment

of independence seems more likely to go undetected in
municipal audits, where audit firms are small, litigation
risk is low, and flexibility is present.

Therefore inquiry

into reporting decisions in this sector is warranted.

The

foregoing leads to the following research questions:
1.

What level of reporting noncompliance with the
Louisiana Local Government Budget Act is selected by
auditors?

2.

What factors are associated with a lack of consensus
in reporting decisions?
A prominent line of research into audit judgments has

analyzed cue usage in the framework of developing linear
models of auditors' decisions.

In the area of control and

planning judgments, this research has included work by
Ashton (1974), Ashton and Brown (1980), and Hamilton and
Wright (1982).

Holstrum and Messier (1982) provided a

review of judgment capturing experiments in materiality.
These experiments investigated which controls were
considered most important, how risk affected judgments,
which cues were influential in making joint
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materiality/reporting decisions, and how the role of the
auditor affected the opinion given.
Auditor independence has also received considerable
attention in the accounting literature.

Much of this

research has focused on which factors may affect pressures
on the auditor to be less than independent, such as
routineness of the service provided and benefit to the
client (Goldman & Bariev, 1974; Nichols & Price, 1976; and
Shockley, 1982) as well as size of the audit firm
(DeAngelo, 1981c).

Perceptions by others of auditor

independence has also been addressed by past research
(Shockley,

1982; Knapp, 1985).

Because of the unique nature of governmental audits,
many of these issues warrant reconsideration in the public
sector environment.

The fiduciary responsibility is not

comparable between government agencies and business
organizations; accountability to the public for resources
provided involuntarily is of paramount importance in
financial reporting by governments (Governmental Accounting
Standards Board, 1987, pars. 100.156 - 158).

Furthermore,

the emphasis in government is on efficient and effective
management of resources and/or equitable distribution of
services and provision of public goods rather than profit
or maximization of shareholder value (Appleby, 1945;
Frederickson,

1971).
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Stewardship has historically been the primary function
of accounting for municipalities;

heterogeneous groups of

constituents, such as bondholders, taxpayers, voters, and
legislators have different interests in monitoring the
safekeeping of assets, accountability of administrators,
and compliance with laws, regulations, and legally binding
covenants (Copeland & Ingram, 1983).

Thus, auditors must

consider how these dissimilar groups are best served by
financial statements and audit reports under different
conditions.
This study examines governmental auditor reporting
decisions under different conditions as reflections of the
balance struck between maintaining professional integrity
(i.e., independence) and retaining clients.

While there

are many factors that potentially affect the reporting
decision, this study considers budget variance, fiscal
stress, political turnover, and employment sector.

RESEARCH METHOD
The decision of interest in this research is the
disclosure decision in auditing for compliance during a
financial statement audit.

The particular law considered

in this study is the Louisiana Local Government Budget Act,
with which all municipalities or other political
subdivisions of the state must comply.

In particular, the

Act requires municipalities to adopt a budget amendment if
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expenditures exceed the original budget by more than five
percent (LSA-RS 39:1309-1310).
The research questions above were investigated in the
context of the Budget Act using a quasi-experimental
design.

The dependent variable in the experiment was the

reporting decision (RD).

The auditor has the following six

options in reporting:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

No communication
Oral communication with management
Management letter
Footnote disclosure
Compliance report
Financial statement report (Opinion)
The experimental task consisted of sixteen cases

involving a small municipality that had contracted for an
audit in accordance with GAS.

Subjects were asked where,

if anywhere, they would report noncompliance with the
Louisiana Local Government Budget Act.

The responses of

the auditors were analyzed for the impact of four
independent variables on compliance reporting decisions
made.
The first independent variable was unfavorable budget
variance, which was manipulated at three levels.

One

indicated compliance with the Louisiana Local Government
Budget Act, and was primarily included as a validity check
to ensure that subjects understood the law.

The other two

levels indicated different degrees of noncompliance with
the Budget Act.
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The second independent variable was fiscal stress, and
the third independent variable was political turnover.
These two factors were expected to reflect pressures that
impinge on auditor independence and therefore might lower
audit quality and the level of the reporting option chosen.
The fourth independent variable was employment group.
Subjects for the experiment were auditors either in the
private sector or working for the Legislative Auditor of
Louisiana.

These two groups had experience in compliance

auditing, but it was expected there might be differences in
the groups because of the amount of compliance experience
and the compliance emphasis in the training and management
of the two groups.

The auditors' decisions were modelled

using descriptive statistics and ordinal probit analysis.
Finally, consensus within groups was analyzed using
Pearson's product-moment correlation coefficients.

CONTRIBUTIONS
This research had two primary goals.

The first was to

investigate reporting decisions regarding compliance in
governmental audits, an area that has become of increasing
concern to the U. S. government and the AICPA, but which
has received little attention in the academic literature.
The emphasis on compliance, rather than financial, auditing
makes this a unique study.

Secondly, the study investigated the reporting
differences between groups of auditors.

The

compliance-centered training and experience of the staff in
the Legislative Audit group was expected to result in
different patterns of reporting decisions than would be
found in the less specialized private practitioner group.
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as
follows:

Chapter Two reviews a sample of the literature

pertaining to reporting and which variables may affect
auditors when making reporting decisions.

Chapter Three

develops the specific hypotheses to be tested and describes
the research method used.

Chapter Four provides the

results of the experiment, and finally Chapter Five
summarizes the findings, the limitations of the study, and
avenues for future research.

CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
This study considers the factors that may affect
compliance reporting decisions in a governmental context.
Although there has been little experimental research in the
area of governmental auditing, much of the research in
private sector auditing pertains to this study.

A directly

related area of audit research considers materiality and
reporting judgments.

Materiality research has focused

primarily on financial factors affecting materiality
judgments.

A subset of that research stream has

investigated how materiality judgments are manifested in
reporting decisions.
Often in the literature, reporting decisions are also
considered reflective of auditor independence.

Prior

writings on independence have varied from strictly
analytical to experimental.

The analytical writings have

considered factors that may actually impair independence,
whereas most empirical research has concentrated on factors
that give the appearance of impaired independence.

This

discrepancy may result from the difficulty researchers have
in measuring or capturing independence in the experimental
environment.
Finally, an area of considerable activity in
accounting research has been the impact of experience or
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knowledge on audit judgments.

Past research has considered

the impact of experience in several accounting issues, and
the understanding of expertise is rapidly evolving in the
accounting literature.

Issues concerning experience as it

pertains to the subjects in this study will also be
discussed within this review.
Studies of materiality and reporting issues will be
discussed first, followed by a brief introduction to the
independence literature.

Finally, studies concerning

experience and knowledge will be discussed.

However,

because auditor independence and experience affect
reporting decisions and judgments of materiality, the three
research areas outlined above overlap in the literature.

MATERIALITY AND REPORTING
Government Auditing Standards (GAS) require
noncompliance to be reported in the compliance report if it
is considered to be material to the financial statements.
As in Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS), no
specific guidance is provided as to what constitutes
material noncompliance.

Several studies have investigated

auditor judgments of materiality in the private sector, but
little research has investigated materiality in the
governmental sector.

Some of the private sector studies

have looked at materiality in isolation, while others have
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investigated reporting decisions as evidence of materiality
judgments.

Both types of studies will be discussed below.

Materiality
The early research in materiality focused primarily on
understanding which financial factors auditors used in
determining materiality thresholds.

Moriarity and Barron

(1976) conducted an experiment in which hypothetical cases
were constructed manipulating income before tax, earnings
trends, and client size in total assets.

The audit partner

subjects were asked to rank the cases in order of
materiality of a change in an asset's useful life.

Income

was found to be the dominant factor in assessing
materiality.

Earnings trend and firm size were not

significant for most subjects.
In a review of materiality literature, Holstrum and
Messier (1982) found that such results were common to most
studies.

The effect of adjustments on net income was the

predominant factor in all studies they reviewed.

In

general, they found that an adjustment to net income of
less than four percent was almost always immaterial and
that adjustments of over ten percent were almost always
material.

Consensus was lacking in the literature

concerning the range between four and ten percent of net
income.
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Another finding common to most studies reviewed was
that materiality thresholds were different for various
groups concerned with financial statements.

The threshold

was lowest among user groups, including investors, loan
officers, and regulators.

The threshold was highest for

financial statement preparers, with the materiality
threshold falling somewhere in between for auditors.
Holstrum and Messier (1982) concluded that the lack of
materiality guidance from standard setting bodies results
in confusion and a lack of consensus.

This particular gap

between the expectations of users, auditors, and preparers
may only be remedied by the development of more specific
guidelines.
Krogstad, Ettenson, and Shanteau (1984) developed an
experiment to test whether qualitative issues were
considered as well as financial data in making materiality
judgments.

Audit partners, seniors, and university

students were asked to indicate the relative materiality of
a proposed adjustment to the allowance for doubtful
accounts.

Three financial cues manipulated were the effect

on net income, the current ratio, and the earnings per
share trend.

Five qualitative factors manipulated in the

experiment were industry trends, management
cooperativeness,

internal control structure, the expected

users of the statements, and management's accounting policy
conservativeness.

As in numerous prior accounting studies, the effect on
net income accounted for the majority of variability in
auditor judgments; however, no one signal was of
predominant importance for the student subjects.

None of

the qualitative factors was significant when subjects were
pooled in an analysis of variance (ANOVA) model, but when
participants were modelled individually, qualitative
factors were significant.

Different subjects responded to

different qualitative data, resulting in the insignificance
of these factors in the pooled model.
Krogstad, Ettenson, and Shanteau (1984) also measured
consensus among the three groups of subjects.

In the

auditing environment, where "correct” responses are not
usually available, consensus has been employed in the
literature as a measure of expert judgment (Dirsmith,
Covaleski, and McAllister,

1985).

The study found no

significant difference in consensus betv/een the two
practitioner groups, but students demonstrated
significantly less consensus than the practitioners.

The

authors concluded that most of the learning germane to the
materiality task occurs by the time an auditor reaches the
senior level, but that the task was sufficiently complex to
differentiate practitioners from students.
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Reporting Decisions
Another line of materiality research looks beyond
determining materiality thresholds into the question of how
materiality affects reporting decisions.

Boatsman and

Robertson (1974) requested participants in an experiment to
sort cases into three disclosure methods.

Based on eight

financial and market data items, Certified Public
Accountants (CPAs) and security analysts were asked whether
the item a) was immaterial and should not be disclosed, b)
should be disclosed in the footnotes but not in the body of
the statements, or c) should be disclosed as a separate
line item.
As in other materiality studies, subjects placed most
of the weight of their decisions (73 percent of response
variability) on the effect on net income.

A dummy variable

reflecting whether the item was a gain or loss on noncurrent assets was also significant, as was a market risk
factor.

However, a predictive model developed from a

linear discriminant function of the decisions performed
little better than a model based on a simple materiality
cutoff of 4 percent of net income.

Finally, the decision

models of the CPAs and security analysts were not found to
be significantly different from each other.
Stephens (1983) tested whether auditors in an
experiment modified opinions based on the materiality of an
item as well as the weight of audit evidence.

Auditors
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evaluated ten cases and made recommendations for the
opinion to be given.

Materiality was manipulated by a

change in revenue recognition leading to a 1 - 2 percent
versus 15 - 17 percent change in net income.
Contrary to expectations, subjects recommended
modified opinions even when the item was immaterial.

The

weight of evidence did not affect reporting decisions.

In

this experiment, the presence of even a small change led to
a high freguency of modified opinions, even when generally
accepted auditing standards suggest an ungualified opinion
would be appropriate.

This study did not consider any of

the factors which might pressure auditors not to modify
opinions however.
Chewning, Pany, and Wheeler (1989) studied actual
reporting decisions to investigate materiality judgments in
practice.

They gathered data on companies listed in the

Compustat tapes to determine reporting patterns when
companies made a change in accounting principle.

In line

with past research, modifications of the audit opinion
increased as the effect of the change on net income
increased.

The materiality threshold appeared to be

approximately four percent of net income; nearly all
opinions were qualified when the change was greater than
four percent.

Even if the change represented less than a 4

percent change in net income, however, a majority of
opinions contained a consistency exception.
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Chewning, Pany and Wheeler (1989) also investigated
whether reporting decisions differed between discretionary
and nondiscretionary accounting changes.

Below the four

percent materiality threshold, opinions were modified less
frequently if the change was nondiscretionary than if the
change was made at the option of management.

Lastly, then

Big 8 firms modified opinions less frequently than other
firms, indicating that the Big 8 firms had higher
materiality thresholds.
The findings of Chewning, Pany and Wheeler (1989)
differ somewhat from most prior research in materiality,
although they are similar to those of Stephens (1983).

The

threshold seemed to be lower than those found in
experimental studies.

In addition, although auditing

standards do not differentiate between discretionary and
nondiscretionary changes, auditors apparently did
differentiate.

This finding does not concur with Knapp's

(1985, 1987) experimental studies in auditor independence,
which implied that auditors are more susceptible to
management pressures not to qualify opinions if technical
standards do not specify certain actions.
A common element of the materiality and reporting
research discussed above is that it probes decisions in the
private sector.

Although much of the research can be

expected to pertain to governmental auditing, differences
between the for-profit and governmental sectors must be
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considered.

First, the goal of private businesses is

generally to generate income and/or shareholder value, and
net income can be considered to be reflective of a
company's success in achieving its goals.

A governmental

entity exists not to generate income but to provide
services, and there is no measure of success comparable to
net income.

If net income is the basis for materiality

judgments in the private sector, what should be the
measuring stick for auditors in governmental engagements?
One possible alternative guide for materiality
suggested in the private sector has been the size of the
firm.

Firm size has received moderate support as a

materiality determinant in the literature (Holstrum and
Messier, 1982), and where it was supported, total assets
have generally served as the proxy for size.

The

governmental accounting treatment of fixed assets differs
substantially from accrual accounting, however.

Assets are

recorded as expenditures when purchased as well as in a
subsidiary ledger of fixed assets which are not
depreciated.

Therefore total fixed assets in a

governmental entity are not equivalent to total assets in a
private business, so they may not serve as an analogous
guideline for materiality judgments.
The second issue which may differentiate private
sector and governmental materiality and reporting issues is
that in the past, local governments have been relatively

36

isolated from the negative consequences of modified audit
opinions experienced in the private sector (Lynn and
Gaffney, 1990).

Many local governments do not need to

consider market reactions to qualified audit reports.

Even

those that have bonds traded on the market may not be
damaged by qualified reports, as they are fairly common
among governmental entities.

Only twenty-one percent of

cities with populations over 100,000 surveyed by Giroux
(1989)

had unqualified opinions on their financial

statements.
Lynn and Gaffney (1990) studied auditor perceptions of
the messages inherent in qualified audit opinions of
governmental entities.

Fifty-nine auditors were shown six

audit opinions of a hypothetical local government and were
asked to rate the similarity of all possible pairs of
opinions.

Two of the opinions concerned the General

Purpose Financial Statements (GPFS), and four concerned
Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports (CAFR).

The CAFR,

which includes individual fund accounts as well as the
GPFS, is a more thorough report requiring increased audit
scope.

Each subject compared unqualified and qualified

opinions of GPFSs and CAFRs, a disclaimer on a CAFR, and an
adverse opinion on an incomplete CAFR.

Subjects were also

asked to rate the six audit opinions on nine attributes
concerning the role of the auditor and the value of the
opinions.

Analysis of subjects' comparisons indicated that
auditors perceived a lesser difference between unqualified
and qualified opinions than between qualified opinions and
disclaimers or adverse opinions.

On individual attributes,

however, auditors generally rated the qualified opinions
more closely to the disclaimers and adverse opinions than
to the unqualified opinions.

In general, the attribute

scores indicated that auditors believed the auditor was
more responsible for the content and made a more complete
inspection of the statements if the opinion was unqualified
than if it was not.

The auditors also believed that the

opinions were more sufficient for user needs, e.g., that
risk associated with the statements was lower and
additional information was not needed, if the opinion was
unqualified.
In summary, when the auditors in the Lynn and Gaffney
(1990)

study considered the overall message of opinions,

qualified opinions were considered similar to unqualified
opinions.

However, when the implications of the opinions

for the attributes of the accompanying statements were
considered, auditors rated qualified opinions as being more
similar to disclaimers and adverse opinions than to
unqualified opinions.
If auditors are uncertain about how to interpret the
messages being sent by different types of audit opinions in
a governmental context,

it is unclear what the role of

opinions and compliance reports would be if the auditor and
client disagreed about disclosure of noncompliance.

If

auditors perceive qualified opinions to be similar to
unqualified opinions, then the auditor may resist pressure
to minimize disclosure of noncompliance by convincing the
client that the compliance report will not be damaging.

On

the other hand, if exceptions in the opinion and the
additional reports in a governmental audit are viewed to be
similar to disclaimers or adverse opinions, then the client
may increase pressure and the auditor may be more reluctant
threaten to the relationship by disclosing noncompliance.
When auditors and their clients disagree about
disclosure, the auditor must resolve the conflict.

The

auditor must strike a balance between keeping the client
happy, in order to ensure repeat engagements, and
maintaining the appropriate level of professional
detachment, or independence.

A considerable body of

accounting research literature addresses this issue; an
introduction to auditor independence as it pertains to this
study is provided below.

Following a discussion of

independence issues in general, factors that may have an
impact on auditor independence in a municipal environment
will be considered, and pertinent research will be
discussed.

AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE
Theoretical Framework
One of the fundamental rules of the auditing
profession is that auditors must be independent from their
clients.

Independence has been defined in a number of ways

by different writers on the topic.

Penno and Watts (1991,

207) provide a definition of auditor independence that
encompasses reporting practices specifically:
[An independent auditor is] one whose
preferences over financial reporting
alternatives are unaffected (both
directly and indirectly) by
management's preferences.
Mautz and Sharaf (1961) stress the importance of
independence in appearance as well as in fact. They contend
that the appearance of independence is necessary if
auditing is to be accepted as a profession and if audited
financial statements are to be valued by the public.
Goldman and Bariev (1974) noted that by the very
structure of the auditing profession, where auditors are
contracted by firms yet are expected to remain independent
of those firms, pressures to compromise independence are
inherently present.

If an auditor chooses a reporting

option that reflects negatively on the client, it is
possible that the client will not engage the auditor in the
future.

Shockley (1982) analyzed the auditor-client
relationship from a power-control theory perspective.

He

identified two factors which affect the auditor's power vis
a vis the client.

The first factor is the routineness of

the services being provided by the auditor.

Routineness is

directly related to competition for audit services.

The

more routine the service, the more likely it is that other
auditors are available to perform the service.

It follows,

then, that increased competition for audit services
increases the power of the client and threatens to impair
auditor independence.
In a series of papers, DeAngelo (1981a, 1981b, 1981c)
derived economic models of the auditor-client relationship.
Because auditing is a competitive business, audit firms may
bid below cost for the initial engagement to attract new
clients (DeAngelo, 1981b).

Client-specific knowledge

carries over to future engagements, however, reducing costs
associated with subsequent audits.

This enables the

auditor to earn a series of economic quasi-rents, providing
incentive for the auditor to compromise independence to
maintain client relationships.
There are, however, disincentives that counterbalance
threats to auditor independence.

If an auditor is caught

compromising independence, he or she faces loss of
reputation and may also face sanctions and even legal
liability (DeAngelo, 1981c; Shockley, 1982).

If an auditor
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is considering compromising independence, the possibility
of losing a series of client-specific guasi-rents must be
weighed against the possibility of losing other clients due
to loss of reputation if discovered.
Several factors may affect the relative weights of
these two possibilities.

DeAngelo (1981c) demonstrated

that firms with a large client base are less likely to be
economically vulnerable to client pressures.

If the quasi

rents gained from one client make up only a minute
percentage of a firm's revenues, that specific stream is
likely to have much less impact on the firm than losses
that would be suffered if several other clients changed to
a more credible auditor.

A specific governmental client

may represent a material portion of revenues for the small
firms that perform most municipal audits in Louisiana,
however.

In that case, the loss of client-specific

revenues could have a big enough impact on the audit firm
that the auditor would be more susceptible to client
pressures to under-report breaches of laws and regulations.
Regardless of firm size, however, DeAngelo (1981a)
notes that industry specialization may mitigate the losses
associated with losing a particular client.

If an auditor

gains industry-specific knowledge in the course of an
audit, knowledge carries over to other clients in the same
industry.

This specialized knowledge reduces the cost of

future audits of other clients in that industry.

Therefore
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the quasi-rents associated with a client are not completely
lost if one client relationship is terminated over a
disclosure dispute, as long as the auditor has other
clients in the same industry.
Governmental auditing can be considered such an
industry where specialized knowledge is necessary.

The

accounting principles differ from those of private sector
businesses, and the additional auditing standards require
auditors to be familiar with many issues not present in a
private sector audit.

Therefore even the small firms that

perform most municipal audits can carry reduced costs from
one client to another, diminishing the dependence on any
particular client.

This implies that small audit firms

that specialize in governmental audits may be no more
susceptible to pressures against independence than larger
firms.

However, small firms that do not specialize may be

more likely to succumb to client persuasion.

Empirical Research
Several studies have relied on the theoretical
framework described above to develop expectations about
auditing practices and people's perceptions of auditing
practices.

Auditor independence is virtually impossible to

measure directly, so empirical studies have had to focus
instead on perceptions and the appearance of independence.
Shockley (1981) surveyed CPAs, financial analysts, and loan
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officers to determine which factors were perceived as
impairing the independence of auditors.

All groups of

subjects believed that independence would be threatened if
the competition for audit services was high or if the audit
firm was engaged for additional non-audit services, such as
Management Advisory Services (MAS).
Audit firm size was significant among CPAs in the
survey.

Auditors from the then Big 8 firms perceived that

auditors from small firms were more likely to be impaired
than were auditors from large firms.

Not surprisingly,

however, auditors from small firms did not perceive that
audit firm size would impact the independence of the
auditors, nor did the financial analysts or loan officers.
Additional empirical studies have investigated which
factors other than firm size affect financial statements
users' perceptions of auditor independence.

One factor

which has consistently been shown to affect perceptions is
the financial condition of the client.

These studies will

be discussed below.

Financial Condition
Knapp conducted experiments to investigate perceptions
of auditor independence.

In the first of two studies,

Knapp (1985) manipulated four factors, and loan officers
were asked to indicate the likelihood that managers would
obtain their preferred outcome in a dispute with the
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auditor.

The subjects in the experiment perceived that

auditors would have more difficulty resisting pressure from
management if 1) the client was in a strong financial
condition, 2) the conflict arose over a non-technical
standard, 3) the audit firm also provided MAS to the
client, and 4) the market for audit services was
competitive.
In a similar study, Knapp (1987) asked audit committee
members the likelihood that they would support the auditor
in an auditor-client conflict.

Two of the manipulated

factors, financial condition of the client and technicality
of the standard, were the same as in the 1985 study.

A

third manipulated variable was the size of the audit firm.
Finally, the fourth variable was the type of audit
committee member, e.g., whether the member was presently a
corporate manager or whether he or she was either a retired
corporate executive or from a non-business background.
Knapp found that audit committee members would support
the auditor in conflicts in general.

More specifically,

they would be more likely to support the auditor if the
client was in poor financial condition, if the dispute
concerned a matter dealt with by a technical standard, or
if the audit firm was large.

Corporate managers were also

more likely overall to support the auditors than were other
types of audit committee members.
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Financial condition of the client was significant in
both Knapp studies.

He reasoned that if the client were in

poor financial condition, the auditor would be more
susceptible to legal liability if independence were judged
to be impaired, making the auditor more resistant to client
pressures.

By contrast, if the client was financially

healthy, auditors would believe they were less likely to be
scrutinized or sued, making them more susceptible to
influence by managers.
In addition, both studies indicated that the auditor
was in a stronger position if the auditing or accounting
standard was technical, i.e., users perceived they would be
better able to withstand pressure and audit committee
members were more likely to support the auditor.

Knapp

suggested that if the standard dealing with a disputed
issue is not technical, the reporting treatment is more
flexible; therefore auditors would be less likely to resist
the wishes of managers.

Again, this is explained as being

due to the increased potential for legal liability of the
auditor and the directors.

A similar legal liability does

not necessarily exist in the public sector, and in cases of
violations of the Budget Act there is no comparable
concern.
However, the financial condition of the municipality
may still influence the auditor's independence.

When

municipalities experience declining revenues, past research
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has shown that citizen groups will mobilize to protect
their interests.

In a study of municipal governments

progressing through cycles of fiscal stress and
retrenchment, Levine, Rubin, and Wolohojian (1981) found
that interest groups existing during periods of good
financial health would strengthen coalitions and increase
lobbying activity concerning budget allocations when
financial health deteriorated.
If interest groups increase attention to the budget
when the municipality is in poor financial condition, the
financial statements, and by extension the auditor, will
likely be under more scrutiny as well.

If the auditor

believes this to be true, he or she would be less likely to
compromise on disclosure if the governmental client is
experiencing fiscal stress despite the lack of legal
liability.
Although most studies of fiscal stress vis a vis
auditor performance have contemplated the private sector,
Deis and Giroux (1992) considered the impact of financial
health and other factors in a governmental context.

They

looked at quality control review papers for independent
school districts in Texas to evaluate which factors were
associated with lower audit quality.

Audit quality, which

was defined as the probability that discovered breaches
would be reported, was considered to reflect auditor
independence.

Although audit quality remains only a proxy
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for independence,

it may be the most direct test of

independence possible.
Several of the factors discussed previously,

including

financial health of the client and specialization of the
audit firm, were tested as determinants of audit quality.
Evidence indicates that auditors did in fact reduce audit
quality in audits of financially strong public sector
clients.

This implies that an auditor may be more inclined

to compromise independence when the client's healthy
condition reduces the likelihood of scrutiny or legal
liability.

Deis and Giroux (1992) also found that more

specialized audit firms performed higher quality audits,
lending support to DeAngelo's (1981a) theory that
specialization of audit firms would reduce the impact of
lost client-specific revenues, leading to increased auditor
independence.
If fiscal stress affects auditor independence, as
implied by the studies discussed above, it may result in
different reporting decisions, ceteris paribus.

Fiscal

Stress is therefore included as an independent variable in
this study.

Another factor that may affect auditor

independence stems from the political environment of a
municipality.

This issue will be discussed in the

following section.
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Political Environment
The political environment is perhaps what most
differentiates governmental audits from private sector
audits.

It has been argued that the political salience of

local governments has become greater as the public
expenditure climate has deteriorated in the last decade,
making local elections the battleground for increasingly
ideological economic debate (Goergen & Norpoth, 1991;
Isaac-Henry & Painter,

1991).

Baber (1990) modelled the role of accounting
information in the political environment.

He argued that

because voters are expected to be rationally ignorant of
the actions of politicians and bureaucrats, accounting
information only plays a role when political competition is
high.
Baber (1990) maintained that competitors will enter
into a political race only if they believe the rewards of
office will exceed the costs of running.

If most interest

groups are affiliated with an incumbent, the cost of
convincing them to change alliances may be too high, and
the incumbent will be uncontested.

If the costs are high,

the political competition will be low, and the incumbent
has no incentive to disclose his or her actions.
However, if only a narrow majority is with the
incumbent, the costs of attaining a majority for the
challenger are lower.

If the costs to challengers are low,
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the ability of the incumbent to maintain the majority is
dependent upon whether pre-election actions benefitted
interest groups in the majority coalition.

According to

Baber, if the incumbent's actions benefitted interest
groups, he or she will win the election in a highly
competitive race.

However, if the incumbent's actions were

not beneficial, the challenger will be able to win over a
critical number of interest groups, winning the election.
When competition is high, therefore, interest groups
and challengers want to monitor the actions of the
incumbent.

Accounting information provides evidence of the

incumbent's stewardship (or lack thereof).

If the

incumbent's actions were positive, such as staying within
the budget, he or she has an incentive to disclose it.

If

the accounting information might jeopardize the incumbent's
future political career, he or she will try to avoid
disclosure (Baber & Sen, 1984; Ingram, 1984).

Ingram

(1984) found that accounting disclosure at the state level
was inversely related to strength of the press, which was
interpreted as attempts by politicians to defend themselves
by disclosing less.
If a municipality is dealing with fiscal stress,
politicians generally try to minimize problems, hide
deficits, and deny responsibility for predicaments (Levine,
Rubin, and Wolohojian,

1981).

Although the mandated

financial reporting and auditing in Louisiana makes it
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difficult to hide budgetary excesses completely,
information may be displayed in a way to obscure rather
than elucidate the problem (Rubin, 1990).
Public budgeting is a highly political process, and
Rubin (1990) contends that when political actors want to
enhance their clout, they often focus on power over the
budget as a way to attain it.

If the budget is a source of

political power, then mismanagement of the budget could be
a source of power erosion.

Rubin (1990, 232) asserts that

. . . when governments run deficits
because they lack internal discipline,
or ignore or redefine the constraints
of balance, they may be embarrassed by
the consequences, and in the face of
what would be widespread public
disapproval. . . they sometimes choose
to hide the deficits.
If the politician wishes to hide deficits, a likely
outcome of exceeding the budget,

it seems reasonable to

expect that the politician would exert pressure against the
auditor to minimize disclosure as well.

Even if the mayor

cannot directly control expenditures on the part of
bureaucrats,

it is the mayor who answers to the public

through the election process.

Giroux (1989, 202-203) noted

that because "the public cannot influence the bureaucracy
directly . . . they must work through the [elected
officials] to change budget priorities."
When political competition is high and the budget has
been exceeded, the auditor is likely to be pressured to

minimize disclosure.

On the other hand, external forces to

maintain independence may counteract them.

If interest

groups are scrutinizing the budget and past performance of
the incumbent, the financial statements are a primary
source of information.

Scrutiny of the financial

statements may correspond to increased scrutiny of the
auditor as well.

The literature has examined the motives

of politicians regarding the budget, but there has been no
examination of how those motives spill over to the actions
of auditors.

Therefore the political environment of the

municipality will also be considered in this study.
The final factor to be considered in this study is the
employment sector of the auditor.

Until 1991, the Office

of the Legislative Auditor and any private accounting firm
could bid for local government audit engagements.1 These
two groups of auditors may differ in both expertise in
governmental auditing and in motivations when dealing with
client conflict.

These issues will be discussed in the

following section.

AUDITOR EMPLOYMENT SECTOR
Auditors employed by the public sector may differ from
those in the private sector for various reasons.

Public

1 In 1991, private accounting firms successfully
lobbied the Louisiana legislature to bar the Office of the
Legislative Auditor from the bidding process, claiming that
state revenue allocations provided them with an unfair
competitive advantage.

sector auditors are specialists who work exclusively on
governmental engagements, whereas those employed in the
private sector are likely to have a combination of
governmental and private sector clients.
specialization may lead to more expertise.

This
A government

employee may also have a different view of his or her role
as an auditor and is unlikely to feel the same competitive
pressures to maintain client relationships as is an auditor
who depends on the good will of clients to stay in
business.

Accounting researchers have been prolific in the

area of auditor expertise, but there has been little
written about other qualitative factors that may differ
between these two groups of auditors.

Literature

pertaining to auditor expertise will be discussed in this
final section of the literature review, and inferences
about other differences between public and private sector
auditors will be considered as well.
Psychological research has demonstrated that
experience increases the knowledge store of decision makers
and affects the way in which that knowledge is organized,
resulting in improved decision making abilities.
Behavioral accounting research has made it increasingly
clear, however, that general experience may not be the best
measure of knowledge or expertise.
In earlier studies knowledge was an ex post
explanation if experience was significant in determining
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auditor judgments; however, because results were generally
mixed, later studies searched for other measures of
expertise that would avoid confounding experience with
other factors (Libby, 1991).

Some of the studies that have

found expertise differences related to experience will be
discussed below.
Messier (1983) investigated whether experience
affected materiality judgments.

All subjects in the study

were audit partners, but they had a wide range of
experience.

The experiment consisted of 32 cases in which

an inventory write-down was being considered.

Subjects

were asked to rate the materiality of the write-down on a
seven point scale and to give the probability that it
should be disclosed on the income statement.
Five financial variables were manipulated in the
experiment, and as in most materiality studies, the effect
on net income explained over 75 percent of the variance in
responses.

Experience was not significant in the

materiality ratings, but it was significant in the
resulting reporting decisions.

In addition, more

experienced auditors demonstrated higher consensus in their
judgments than did less experienced auditors.

Under the

standard interpretation then, the more experienced subjects
in Messier's (1983) study demonstrated more expertise.
Frederick and Libby (1986) argued that for experienced
auditors to demonstrate expertise, they must be asked to
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make judgments where expertise would be expected to produce
different responses.

Frederick and Libby designed an

experiment in which subjects were asked to predict the
financial statement implications of internal control
weaknesses.
Errors in two pairs of accounts were reported in the
experiment.

Because of the double-entry nature of

accounting, both pairs of errors were likely to be
reasonable to inexperienced and experienced subjects.
Frederick and Libby noted that only decision-makers with
expertise in auditing could identify scenarios
representative of internal control system weaknesses.

As

they predicted, experienced auditors were able to identify
which internal control weaknesses would result in which
pair of account errors whereas inexperienced auditors were
unable to make similar assessments.
Bonner and Lewis (1990) differentiated four types of
knowledge that may be germane to auditing tasks: general
domain knowledge, subspecialty knowledge, world knowledge,
and general problem solving ability.

General domain

knowledge is that gained by most people in a domain, such
as auditing, through instruction and experience.
Subspecialty knowledge is related to a subspecialty within
the domain, acquired in a similar fashion, but only by
those in that subspecialty area.

World knowledge, such as

general business knowledge, is gained from life experiences
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rather than through instruction or domain experience.
Finally, general problem solving ability is partially
innate and partially refined through experience.
Ashton (1991, 219) tested the effects of
domain-specific (subspecialty) knowledge in auditor
judgments of error frequencies.

Auditors were asked to

estimate how frequently certain accounts contained errors
and what the most frequent causes of those errors were.
The estimates were compared to archival data to assess
accuracy.

There was no clear increase in accuracy with

experience when auditors considered five separate
industries.

However, when auditors with experience in a

particular industry were asked for error frequencies within
their industry, the relationship between subspecialty
experience and accuracy was strong.

She concluded that:

audit experience should be viewed as relating to
specific tasks rather than as a singular,
all-encompassing concept and that particular
experience must be understood as it relates to a
particular type of knowledge.
Meixner and Welker (1988) conducted an experiment to
investigate which type of experience led to expertise, as
measured by judgment consensus.

They differentiated

situational experience, or total audit experience, from
organizational experience, which referred to the duration
of a subordinate's experience with a particular audit staff
and its superior.

It was argued that the reason previous

studies had found conflicting results when attempting to
show a positive relationship between experience and
consensus was an inappropriate definition of experience as
situational, rather than organizational experience.

A

field experiment was performed using staff members at the
State Auditor's Office of the State of Texas.

The office

is split into eight groups, each headed by a different
manager.

Subjects responded to 36 cases having to do with

internal control questionnaires.

The task was to assess

strength of internal controls on a seven-point scale.

The

authors found that longer situational experience (total
audit experience) did not result in higher consensus.

In

contrast, a significant increase in consensus was found to
be associated with increased organizational experience.
Tying this result into the framework of Bonner and Lewis
(1990), total audit experience may increase general domain
knowledge, but perhaps organizational experience is
required to gain subspecialty knowledge.
Many of the auditors who work for the Office of the
Legislative Auditor are employed there for their entire
careers.

Therefore, they may be more poised than private

practitioners to gain the subspecialty knowledge required
for governmental audits.

It also seems likely that their

long-term organizational experience would lead to higher
consensus than would be found among less specialized
auditors working for various organizations.
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Legislative auditors and private practitioners may
differ on other counts as well.

In a review of non-

academic literature, Ramanan and Rubin (1989) found mixed
arguments about the relative independence of these two
groups.

Clients may find it more difficult to pressure

auditors who are representatives of a governmental agency
because there is a threat that any undue pressure could be
reported to those with authority over transfer payments.
If legislative auditors are part of an established
bureaucracy that audits non-municipal entities as well,
they may also be immune from market pressures to satisfy
clients.
A private practitioner is unlikely to have either of
these advantages over the client.

However, credit analysts

have historically placed higher value on municipal audits
performed by private practitioners (Ramanan and Rubin,
1989).

This preference may be due to perceptions of

independence, competence, or other factors.
is not clear on this point.

The literature

If private sector auditor

integrity was a serious concern, however, this preference
would be unlikely.
Finally, the two groups of municipal auditors may
differ in their approaches to auditing.

Kropatkin and

Forrester (1983, 15) maintained that the goals of private
practitioners and federal auditors are different:
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In the view of many observers, the federal
auditor traditionally approaches a [client's]
claims with the sole intent of looking for
errors.
Nonfederal auditors (and particularly
public accountants) are thought to go to extremes
to provide the grantee with a positive
demonstration of accountability, or worse, to
pass over issues of real significance.
Although Kropatkin and Forrester referred to federal
auditors, it seems logical to extend the same argument to
state auditors.

In a review of belief revision studies,

Asare and Messier (1991) noted that state auditors are
generally predisposed toward negative evidence.

However,

in their own study, they found that the opposite was true,
leading them to conclude that state auditor sensitivity
toward negative evidence is shaped by the legal and
professional environment of a particular engagement, not by
a predisposition to expose clients.
Little research comparing the two groups of municipal
auditors has been conducted.

Perceptions of independence

and audit goals have been debated, but empirical research
to back up the debate is lacking.

Evidence-proneness has

been studied more scientifically, but the results have been
conflicting and inconclusive.

Ramanan and Rubin (1989)

note that the majority of states allow either private
practitioners or state (legislative) auditors to perform
municipal audits.

Empirical research contrasting the

performance of these groups is needed if any conclusions
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are to be drawn as to which is better suited for such
engagements.

SUMMARY
In order for a governmental auditor to report
noncompliance in the compliance report, the auditor must
view the breach as material to the financial statements.
The materiality and reporting literature is predominantly
conducted in the private sector, where guidelines are
fairly well established, if not specifically stated.
Governmental guidelines are less fully developed because
the standard reference points, such as net income and firm
size, are absent.

Research is needed into what factors

influence an auditor's materiality judgments in
governmental contexts.
Materiality is a concept which has traditionally been
applied to individual account balances.

Government

auditing standards require auditors to take this concept
into a new domain by evaluating the materiality of
noncompliance with laws and regulations.

Little research

has investigated how the materiality concept is interpreted
in this relatively new role for auditors.
For noncompliance to be reported, the auditor must
view the breach as material and must be independent from
the client.

Considerable research has investigated what

factors may impair auditor independence and how such
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impairment may affect reporting decisions.

However, much

of the reporting decision literature views reporting as
strictly a function of materiality and not reflective of
auditor independence.

When materiality is clear-cut,

auditor independence may not factor into the reporting
decision.

Research into reporting decisions when

materiality is questionable may shed more light on the
factors that impair auditor independence.
Finally, municipal audits may be conducted by two
distinct groups of auditors.

There are mixed arguments as

to the relative independence of the legislative auditors
and private practitioners, as well as their audit
objectives, views of their clientele, and sensitivity
towards positive or negative evidence.

In addition to

these issues, the results of the study by Meixner and
Welker (1988) suggest that organizational experience may
increase the relative expertise and consensus of
legislative auditors.
This study is the first to consider materiality and
reporting, independence, and experience simultaneously in
the governmental environment.

The results of this research

should reveal materiality thresholds in governmental
contexts, how those materiality judgments are manifested in
reporting decisions, and whether factors that have been
proposed as threats to auditor independence play a role in
reporting decisions.

Finally, this study will shed light
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on the differences between the two types of auditors that
may be engaged in governmental audits.

CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHOD
Compliance reporting decisions concerning the
Louisiana Local Government Budget Act are examined in this
study.

This chapter outlines the research method used.

In

the first section, the hypotheses to be tested are
developed.

In the second section, the subjects,

experimental design, and experimental instrument are
discussed.

In the final section, the statistical tools

used are described.

RESEARCH HYPOTHESES
Discovery of failure by an audit client to comply with
the Louisiana Local Government Budget Act requires some
level of disclosure by the auditor.

Reporting decisions

signal the auditor's materiality judgment.

In a flexible

reporting situation, the auditor's disclosure decision may
also reflect a balance between competing goals of client
retention and maintaining professional integrity.

Two

research questions drive this study:
1.

What level of reporting noncompliance with the
Louisiana Local Government Budget Act is selected by
auditors?

2.

What factors are associated with a lack of consensus
in reporting decisions?
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Prior audit judgment research has analyzed cue usage
in the framework of developing linear models of auditors'
decisions (e.g., Ashton, 1974; Ashton and Brown, 1980; and
Hamilton and Wright, 1982) .

While many factors potentially

affect the compliance reporting decision, this study
considers budget variance, fiscal stress, political
environment, and employment sector.

Hypotheses concerning

these factors are developed below.

Budget Variance
Government Auditing Standards (GAS) require material
noncompliance with laws and regulations to be reported.

In

reality, noncompliance with the Budget Act does not have
any material impact on the financial statements.
Noncompliance will not cause a municipality to lose its
future funding or force it to refund taxes.

The only legal

recourse available to citizens is to obtain an injunction
against further extra-budgeted expenditures.

At issue is

the materiality or significance of the violation in its own
right.1

1 The Yellow Book defines significance as, "the
importance, in relation to the audit objectives, of an item
event, information, or matter, or of a problem the auditor
identifies." This is somewhat different from materiality,
which in the Yellow Book is defined as, "the magnitude of
an omission or misstatement of accounting information that
... makes it probable that the judgment of a reasonable
person relying on the information would have been changed
or influenced by the omission or misstatement." (GAO, 1988,
G-8)

Effects on net income have been the major determinant
of materiality thresholds found in private sector research
(Holstrum and Messier, 1982).

There is no analogous figure

in governmental accounting, but revenues and expenses are
addressed in the budget.

Therefore, unfavorable variance

from the budgeted expenditures may serve as a materiality
guideline for auditors.

If this is the case, auditors may

have similar thresholds for budget variance as they do for
effect on net income.

Low budget variance may be viewed

similarly to a low impact on net income, leading the
auditor to judge noncompliance as nonmaterial, whereas high
budget variance may be considered material noncompliance.
Budget variance below five percent is not a violation
of the Budget Act and requires no reporting.

Expenditures

in excess of the budget by more than five percent represent
noncompliance and require the auditor to evaluate the
reporting options.

Chewning, Pany, and Wheeler (1989)

found that opinions were modified more frequently when
changes in accounting principle had a high impact on net
income.

If budget variance is great, governmental auditors

may similarly believe that a high order of disclosure is
appropriate.

If the auditor believes that noncompliance

with the Budget Act is significant regardless of the dollar
impact, the auditor may report budget variance at any level
over five percent in the compliance report.

In either

case, higher levels of budget variance are expected to
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result in higher levels of noncompliance reporting.

This

leads to the first hypothesis:
Hl0: The percentage variance from the budget will not
affect the reporting decision.
H1a: Higher percentages of unfavorable budget variance will
result in higher level noncompliance reporting.
As in prior research (e.g. Boatsman and Robertson,
1974; Stephens, 1983; and Chewning, Pany, and Wheeler,
1989), reporting decisions are examined in this study for
their insight into auditor materiality judgments.

A second

line of audit research has examined factors that may impair
auditor independence, thus affecting reporting decisions.
Two such factors considered in this study are fiscal stress
and political environment.

The impact these two factors

are expected to have on compliance reporting decisions will
be discussed below.

Fiscal Stress
Prior research has shown that auditors are perceived
to be better able to maintain their independence from
clients when the auditee is in poor financial condition
(Knapp, 1985), and that audit committee members are more
likely to support the auditor should a conflict arise with
a client in such a situation (Knapp, 1987).

This has been

explained as being due to the increased potential for legal
liability of the auditor and the directors.

Although there are no analogous legal ramifications
for the auditor for failing to disclose a violation of the
Budget Act, an auditor may still be expected to avoid the
appearance of impaired independence for financially
troubled governmental clients.

When municipalities

experience declining revenues, past research has shown that
citizen groups actively protect their interests (Levine,
Rubin, and Wolohojian, 1981).

In situations of fiscal

stress, the auditor and/or the municipal government likely
will be under more scrutiny than if the municipality is in
a healthy financial condition.
Heightened public scrutiny could endanger the
auditor's

professional reputation if instances of

noncompliance are not reported.

Therefore the auditor must

choose higher level reporting options (e.g., compliance
report or opinion) to maintain a good professional
reputation.

However,

if fiscal stress is absent, scrutiny

can be expected to be lower.

In this case, the auditor's

professional reputation is not necessarily as endangered,
and thus a lower level of disclosure may be used.
Empirical evidence has shown that audits of financially
strong public sector clients are lower in quality (Deis and
Giroux, 1992).

If auditors are more inclined to compromise

their independence when the client's healthy condition
reduces the likelihood of scrutiny, lower quality audits
may result and reporting levels may be reduced:
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H20: Fiscal stress will not affect the auditor's reporting
decision.
H2a: High (low) fiscal stress will be associated with a
higher (lower) level of noncompliance reporting.
Political Environment
The political environment differentiates governmental
audits from private sector audits.

As the primary document

in determining the economic activity of a municipality, the
budget is a logical subject of political debate.

Factors

that affect the salience of the budget, such as political
competition, may therefore affect the seriousness with
which auditors view violations of the Budget Act or the
likelihood they will compromise their independence.
Baber (1990) noted that elected officials use audited
accounting information to communicate their actions,
leading to increased political sensitivity of the budget.
The use of accounting information depends on the level of
political competition.

When political competition is high,

incumbents benefit from increased accounting disclosures
only if their actions have benefitted constituents (Baber,
1990).

When political competition is low, disclosure of

past activities is unlikely to affect the outcomes of
future elections, and the incumbent has little incentive
for disclosure (Baber & Sen, 1984; Ingram, 1984).
By contrast, newly elected politicians have no
incentive to resist disclosure of budgetary problems.

Goergen and Norpoth (1991) found that the public seems to
grant a newly elected official a "popularity credit" during
the first year of office.

During this period, the public

is more receptive to the argument that any problems are the
fault of the previous administration, particularly when
considering economic outcomes.

Therefore, newly elected

officials tend to disclose or publicize any economic
difficulties, such as over-expenditures, as soon as
possible.

Disclosure promotes the perception of the new

official as an honest one who inherited a bad situation
rather than as one who caused it or tried to hide it
(Goergen and Norpoth, 1991).
If a governmental auditor finds noncompliance with the
Budget Act in the first audit after a new mayor has been
elected in a highly competitive race, a higher order of
reporting can be expected.

The new mayor can blame any

budgetary problems on the previous administration during
the "popularity credit" period, and is unlikely to resist
disclosure.

Therefore, a high level of reporting allows

the auditor to maintain professional integrity without
jeopardizing the auditor-client relationship.
By contrast, if the mayor is an incumbent in a
noncompetitive political environment, he or she will try to
hide problems such as deficits and mismanagement (Rubin,
1990).

Conflict would likely result if an auditor

suggested reporting noncompliance with the Budget Act
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within the financial statements.

Pressure from the

incumbent could lead the auditor to compromise independence
in order to maintain the client relationship.

Therefore a

lower level of reporting is expected if the mayor is an
incumbent than if political turnover in a highly
competitive election has occurred:
H30: Political turnover will not affect the auditor's
reporting decision.
H3a: Political turnover will be associated with a higher
level of noncompliance reporting.

Employment Sector
Currently, only private audit firms perform local
government audits in Louisiana, but until July, 1991, such
audits could be performed either by private practitioners
or by staff members of the Legislative Auditor's Office.
These two groups are likely to be fundamentally different,
both in governmental auditing experience and approaches to
compliance reporting judgments.

Accounting researchers

have investigated the link between work experience and
audit judgments with mixed results.2

Bonner and Lewis

(1990, 3) discuss the findings of prior accounting research
and suggest that researchers consider knowledge needed to

2 See for example Ashton and Brown (1980), Hamilton
and Wright (1982), Messier (1983), Butler (1986), Frederick
and Libby (1986), Biggs, Mock, and Watkins (1988), Meixner
and Welker (1988), Kaplan and Reckers (1989), and Libby
(1991).
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complete tasks and, "not assume that all persons at a given
level of experience equally possess task-specific
knowledge."
Ashton (1991, 219) tested the effects of subspecialty
knowledge in auditor judgments of error frequencies.

She

found a significant relationship between subspecialty
experience and judgment accuracy but no relationship
between general auditing experience and accuracy.

Her

findings suggest that if experience is to be used as a
proxy for expertise, subspecialty experience is most
relevant.
Legislative auditors work exclusively on governmental
engagements, which gives them more subspecialty experience
than their private practitioner counterparts.

Bonner and

Lewis (1990) suggest that this should lead to differences
in subspecialty knowledge, which may result in the adoption
of different disclosure choices.

Kropatkin and Forrester

(1983) noted that whereas auditors employed by the
government are perceived as seeking out problems, private
practitioners are perceived as enabling the client to look
as good as possible, suggesting that

private practitioners

would be expected to report noncompliance at a lower level
than legislative auditors:
H40: Group membership will not affect the auditor's
reporting decision.
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H4a: Legislative auditors will use higher levels of
noncompliance reporting than will private
practitioners.
Another element that may lead to expected differences
between these two groups could be a different approach to
violations of the Budget Act and compliance reporting in
general.

The legislative audit group is trained to be

particularly sensitive to noncompliance, and an internal
memo to the legislative audit staff from the Policy and
Quality Assurance Department specifically highlighted
noncompliance with the Budget Act as a significant
finding.3

Therefore, at any level above five percent

variance the legislative audit group is expected to
disclose noncompliance at the compliance report level.
However, private practitioners may not be sensitized to the
Budget Act and may judge violations with respect to
materiality thresholds.
If private practitioners make materiality judgments,
but legislative auditors simply judge compliance itself,
the following reporting decisions would be expected:

if

3 The memo provided illustrations of material
noncompliance, findings that were not material but were
significant, and nonmaterial noncompliance.
Unfavorable
budget variance of over five percent was cited as a
significant violation of the Budget Act.
The memo further
stated that all instances of material or significant
noncompliance were to be reported in the compliance report.
Because this study took place ten months after the memo was
circulated, however, it was not expected that auditors
would automatically recall the directive.

72

the budget variance did not exceed the five percent limit,
neither group would report noncompliance.

If variance was

in excess of traditional materiality thresholds, both
groups would report noncompliance on the compliance report.
However, if the variance is marginally above the limit,
legislative auditors would report on the compliance report,
whereas private practitioners may judge the violation as
nonmaterial and report at a lower level or not at all:
H4b: Group membership will have a significant interaction
with budget variance in determining the level of
noncompliance reporting.
Most of the legislative audit staff have had little
experience as private practitioners.

As members of a large

staff supported by state funds, they are generally immune
from any financial ramifications of losing a client.
Private practitioners, on the other hand, must be concerned
about the viability of their practice if they sacrifice
client-specific revenues.

Shockley (1982) noted that when

auditors rely on good will from clients to stay in
business, it can be difficult for them to remain
independent.
For large firms, client-specific revenues are likely
to be a small enough portion of total revenues that the
auditor can maintain independence.

Small firms, such as

those engaged for most municipal audits, are less likely to
be able to withstand the loss of a particular client,

however, and may be more likely to compromise under client
pressure (DeAngelo, 1981c).

Therefore the fiscal stress

and political turnover factors discussed previously, that
may increase pressure on auditors to compromise their
independence, may only affect the private practitioners.
Therefore the legislative audit group is expected to
respond predominantly to the budget variance, whereas the
private practitioner group may consider other contextual
factors as well:
H4C: Group membership will have a significant interaction
with fiscal stress in determining the level of
noncompliance reporting.
H4d: Group membership will have a significant interaction
with political turnover in determining the level of
noncompliance reporting.
Finally, legislative auditors work only in the field
of governmental auditing, while private practitioners have
a mix of governmental and non-governmental clients.
Legislative auditors should therefore develop more
specialized knowledge of governmental auditing.

In the

absence of correct responses, consensus is considered to be
useful for demonstrating expertise (Dirsmith, Covaleski,
and McAllister,

1985).

Therefore,

if subspecialty

experience leads to increased subspecialty knowledge as
Ashton (1991) and Bonner and Lewis (1990) suggest,
legislative auditors should show higher consensus in their
reporting decisions.
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Meixner and Welker (1988) found that general auditing
experience did not explain consensus, but organizational
experience was a significant determinant of consensus.
This finding concurs with Ashton's (1991) findings that
expertise increased with subspecialty experience.

In

addition, because the legislative audit staff receives
similar training and is under one administration, their
disclosure decisions are likely to be more uniform than
those of private practitioners working in various small
firms.

Therefore legislative auditors are expected to

demonstrate higher consensus than are private
practitioners:
H4e: Legislative auditors will show higher consensus in
noncompliance reporting than will private
practitioners.
The research hypotheses were tested in a quasi-experiment.
The model and the experimental procedure are described in
the following section.

METHODOLOGY
Noncompliance reporting decisions in a municipal
financial statement audit are the focus of this study.

The

particular law considered is the Louisiana Local Government
Budget Act, with which all municipalities or other
political subdivisions of the state must comply.

The

Louisiana Local Government Budget Act was first implemented
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in 1980 and last revised in 1984.

The Budget Act is also

among the state laws specifically emphasized in the
Louisiana Governmental Audit Guide (Society of Louisiana
Certified Public Accountants, 1989) , thus is considered a
law with which municipal administrators and governmental
auditors should be familiar.
In particular, the Budget Act requires municipalities
to adopt a budget amendment if expenditures exceed the
original budget by more than five percent (LSA-RS
39:1309-1310).

Therefore, if budget variance is greater

than five percent, and no amendment is adopted, the
governmental entity does not comply with the Budget Act.
The hypotheses outlined above were tested in the
context of the Budget Act using a
quasi-experimental design.

2 x 2 x 2 x 3

The model tested is as follows:

RD = f(BV, FS, PT, G, G X BV, G X FS, G X PT)
where RD = Reporting Decision (6 levels)
BV = Budget Variance (3 levels)
FS = Fiscal Stress (2 levels)
PT = Political Turnover (2 levels)
G

= Group (2 groups)

Dependent Variable
The dependent variable in the experiment was the
Reporting Decision (RD).
six options in reporting:

The auditors had the following
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1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

No communication
Oral communication with management
Management letter
Footnote disclosure
Compliance report
Financial statement report (Opinion)
This variable was treated as ordinal in nature.

If

the auditor indicated that no communication would be made,
RD was assigned a score of 0, oral communication was
assigned a score of 1, and so on.

As discussed in Chapter

1, GAS do not signify a hierarchical differentiation
between the compliance report and the opinion, hence either
report was assigned a score of 4.

Independent Variables
The first independent variable, unfavorable Budget
Variance (BV), was manipulated at three levels:
seven, and sixteen percent.

four,

Four percent is not in

violation of the Budget Act, and therefore no reporting is
required. Certainly the possibility exists that some
"zealous" auditors will report any variance with the
budget, at least in a management letter, regardless of
legal requirements.

The higher budget variance levels,

seven and sixteen percent, indicate different degrees of
noncompliance with the Budget Act.

In materiality studies

that have concentrated on private sector audits, anything
less than four percent of net income has been nonmaterial,
and anything greater than ten percent has always been
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material. Results have been unclear as to where, in the
four to ten percent range, the materiality threshold has
been (Holstrum and Messier, 1982).
Although there is no precise equivalent to net income
in governmental entities, the budget likewise concerns
revenues and expenditures.

Therefore a seven percent

budget variance may fall in the area which may or may not
be considered material, allowing the auditor some
flexibility in disclosing noncompliance.

The auditor may

strike a balance between independence and client retention
by choosing a lower level of disclosure.

Sixteen percent,

by contrast, is over the traditional maximum materiality
thresholds and is likely to be considered material by all
subjects.

Seven and sixteen percent are also likely to be

considered realistic by the subjects; a preliminary study
of financial reports of Louisiana municipalities showed
that actual budget variances of these levels were quite
common.

Significance of this variable in the model would

support Hypothesis 1A.
The second independent variable is Fiscal Stress (FS).
Various measures have been proposed to alert accountants,
public administrators, and financial statement users of
current or impending fiscal stress.

Suggested measures

have included credit default, insolvency, negative fund
balances, negative cash flows, and particular patterns of
revenue decline (Rosenberg & Stallings,

1978; Copeland &
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Ingram, 1983; Wallace, 1985; Apostolou, Giroux, & Welker,
1985; and Mattson & Twogood, 1991).

Declining revenue is

perhaps the most relevant of these measures in considering
the Budget Act.

Without some contextual information,

however, such trends may not be sufficient to signal fiscal
stress; municipalities may draw down accumulated fund
balances deliberately in an effort to avoid raising taxes.
If the revenue trend can be linked to an environmental or
economic change, however, fiscal stress may be more clearly
indicated.
Therefore,

high fiscal stress was indicated

serious erosion in the local tax base,

by a

caused by the

closure of a plant that was a major employer in the area.
The low fiscal stress condition indicated that employment
levels and property values were expected to be stable in
the foreseeable future.

Significance of this variable in

the model would support Hypothesis 2A.
The third independent variable is Political Turnover
(PT).

This variable is used to indicate the political

environment.

In the turnover condition, cases stated that

the municipality had a new mayor in the current year
following a highly competitive election in which the
incumbent was defeated.

The no-turnover condition stated

that the mayor was a popular incumbent serving a third
term.

If political turnover was found to be significant,

Hypothesis 3A would be supported.

Each of the first three independent variables was
manipulated within subjects.

The fourth independent

variable, Employment Group (G), is by necessity a between
subjects variable.

The two groups are private

practitioners and legislative audit staff.
G would lend support to Hypothesis 4A.

Significance of

Hypothesis 4B

posited that legislative auditors may report any
noncompliance at the highest level whereas private sector
auditors may differentiate between the two levels of
noncompliance.

This hypothesis is tested by including the

(BVxG) interaction in the model.

The next two hypotheses

stated the expectation that only private sector auditors
would consider fiscal stress and political turnover in
making their reporting decisions.

Therefore, significance

of the interaction terms (GxFS) and (GxPT) would support
Hypotheses 4C and 4D, respectively.

Subjects
The subjects for the experiment were auditors either
in the private sector or working for the Office of the
Legislative Auditor of Louisiana.
experience in compliance auditing.

Both groups have
The auditors in the

private sector were selected from a list, provided by the
Legislative Auditor, of auditors who had been contracted by
municipalities or other political subdivisions of the state
of Louisiana to perform financial and compliance audits
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within the previous two years.

The auditors from the

Legislative Auditor's Office were selected from all branch
offices and from a range of experience levels.

A weakness

in the study is that the subjects were not randomly
selected, so inferences beyond the subject groups must be
made with caution.

Procedure
The experimental task was conducted through the mail,
with a letter enclosed from the Legislative Auditor
encouraging participation in the experiment.

This letter

was included to increase the response rate.
The subjects received an experimental instrument that
began with a short explanation of the task.

Cases involved

the fictional small town of Pemberton, Louisiana.

The

auditors were instructed that they had been engaged for an
audit of Pemberton in accordance with Government Auditing
Standards.

A list of conditions possible for each case was

also presented with the instructions.

Finally, the

introduction to the experiment included a condensed outline
of the Louisiana Local Government Budget Act.
Cases provided the percentage of budget variance as
well as information about the financial status and
political profile of the municipality.

Each subject

received sixteen cases; twelve cases were required to
provide all possible combinations of the within-subjects
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variables, and following Ashton (1974) and Meixner and
Welker (1988), four cases were duplicated to evaluate
test-retest reliability.

After reading the case

descriptions, subjects were asked where, if anywhere, they
would report noncompliance with the Louisiana Local
Government Budget Act.

Three sample cases, as well as all

introductory materials, are illustrated in the Appendix.
Subjects were asked for certain demographic variables
including the number of CPE credits in governmental audits
they had earned and whether they had received the AICPA
Governmental Accounting and Auditing Certificate of
Educational Achievement (GAACEA).

These data are used to

describe the sample and in an effort to capture additional
expertise elements affecting the decision process.

STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
Data gathered in the experiment were analyzed in an
ordinal probit model.

Ordinary probit and logistic

regression models do not account for the ordinal nature of
the reporting decision variable, and regression treats all
intervals as equal.

However, ordinal probit analysis was

designed for use when a categorical dependent variable is
inherently ordered (McKelvey and Zavoina, 1975).4
4 Accounting researchers have used ordinal probit to
model bond rating reactions to pension variables (Maher,
1987), corporate reactions to the proposed introduction of
current cost accounting (Sutton, 1988), and accounting
choices that alter net income (Press and Weintrop, 1990) .

Ordinal probit assumes that the dependent variable is
a linear function of

the independent variables, suchthat:

Y = X/3 + u, where (? is a

vector of parameters and u is a

random disturbance.

The error term is assumed to be

normally distributed

and independent.

To mitigate

violations of the independence assumption, the cases were
administered in random order, with the constraint that the
four repeated cases were last, and the first repeated case
did not directly follow the initial presentation of that
case.

The order of the within-subjects variables was also

randomized within the individual cases.
Y, the interval dependent variable of the true model,
is unobservable.

Only Z, which is an ordinal version of Y,

with M response categories can be observed.

In this study,

Z is the observable reporting decision, with five
categories.

The five categories represent intervals on the

real line, bounded by three thresholds, /jf such that if:

<

m3

then Z; = l; RD = oral communication
then

RD = management letter

then Zj = 3; RD = footnotes
II

then

n"

Yi <
m 3 < Yi

m2

then Zi = 0; RD = no report
N
II
CO

Yi < 0
0 < Yi < Mi
Mi < Yj < m 2

RD = compliance report or

Maximum likelihood estimators are used to estimate the
parameters (3 and thresholds //;.

Chi-square tests will be

used to further test the model and describe the results.
Finally, consensus within groups will be analyzed using

Pearson's product-moment correlation coefficients.
Coefficients for all possible pairs of subjects will be
computed.

The overall mean correlation coefficient will be

computed, as will the mean correlation coefficients for
each of the two groups.
Hypothesis 4E posited that, because of subspecialty
expertise and relatively uniform managerial influence,
there would be a higher degree of consensus within the
Legislative Audit group than within the private practice
group or all auditors considered together.

A two-sample t-

test contrasting the mean correlation coefficients of the
employment sector groups is used to test the final
hypothesis.

CHAPTER 4
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
This chapter discusses the empirical results of the
experiment described in the previous chapter.

The data

will be characterized first with chi-square tests and then
with results of the ordinal probit analysis. Empirical
results will be compared to the research expectations.

SUBJECTS
Legislative Auditors
Fifty experimental instruments were sent to staff
members of the Office of the Legislative Auditor.

Subjects

were selected by an audit manager who served as a liaison
during this study.

These subjects were selected on a non-

random basis such that the group of subjects would have a
range of experience in compliance auditing, would contain
representatives from each of the three major offices of the
Legislative Auditor around the state, and would be
available and presumed willing to participate.
Of the fifty instruments, 4 5 were returned completed.
Nonresponding subjects were sent up to three letters urging
their participation in an effort to increase the response
rate.

Each experiment contained twelve cases plus four

repeated cases to check for consistency.

Responses were

deemed unusable if the reporting decision on more than one
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of the repeated cases was inconsistent.

One legislative

auditor's response was deemed unusable by the above
consistency criterion, but the remaining 44 responses were
usable.

This represents a usable response rate of 88% for

this group.
Legislative auditors had an average of 14.8 years of
accounting experience, with 12.4 years of governmental
auditing experience.

Twenty-four of the 44 legislative

audit subjects were Certified Public Accountants (CPAs),
one of whom had earned the Governmental Accounting and
Auditing Certificate of Educational Achievement (GAACEA).
Finally,

legislative auditors had received an average of 57

hours of Continuing Professional Education (CPE) in the two
years prior to the study.

Most of the CPE for these

subjects was provided internally, with CPAs and non-CPAs
being instructed jointly.

Private Practitioners
Fifty experimental instruments were sent to private
practitioners experienced in governmental audits.

These

subjects did not necessarily operate their own private
practices; rather, all worked in the private sector for
firms which engaged in governmental auditing.

Subjects

from the private sector were selected from a list, provided
by the Office of the Legislative Auditor, of audit firms
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that had been engaged for municipal audits in the two years
prior to the experiment.
Firms were selected on a non-random basis such that
auditors from all parts of the state and from different
size firms would be included in the sample.

Individual

subjects were solicited over the telephone.

In some

instances, the contact person was willing to provide names
of other subjects.

In many cases, contact persons

requested that they be sent multiple instruments which they
would distribute to others in their firms.
Of the fifty experiments sent, twenty-nine were
completed and returned.

One of the responses was deemed

unusable by the consistency criterion, representing a
usable response rate of 56%.1

Nonresponding subjects

received two follow-up letters as well as an additional
phone call to elicit participation, but the response rate
for this group remained lower than that of the legislative
audit group.

1 It appears likely that several of the instruments
were not distributed to potential subjects.
To illustrate,
one contact person at a larger firm agreed to participate
and volunteered to distribute instruments to four
colleagues within the firm. None of these five was
returned.
It seems reasonable to assume that the contact
person did not distribute the experiments, and therefore
only the contact person should be considered a non
respondent.
Of the fifty experiments, it appears likely
that eleven were never distributed.
Therefore, if the
response rate is adjusted for the likelihood that only 39
experiments reached the intended recipients, the usable
response rate for this group was 72%.
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Private practitioners participating in the study had
an average of 14 years of accounting experience, with 10.8
years of experience in governmental auditing.

Although

there was no significant difference in total experience
between the two groups of subjects, legislative auditors
had significantly more governmental audit experience.
These results are illustrated in Table 4.1.

Private

practitioners had earned less CPE credits, but the
difference was not significant.

Finally, 27 of the 28

private practitioners were CPAs, and 18 had earned the
GAACEA.

STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
The hypotheses outlined in Chapter 3 were tested in
the context of the Louisiana Local Government Budget Act
using a 2 x 2 x 2 x 3

quasi-experimental design.

Incomplete responses were included in the analysis, but the
four repeated cases were excluded.

If a subject was

inconsistent on one case, the response to that case was
eliminated from the analysis.

If the subject was

inconsistent on more than one repeated case, the entire
instrument was deemed unusable, as discussed above.
Responses used in the analysis totalled 844, with 514 from
legislative auditor subjects and the remaining 330 from
private practitioners.

Data were analyzed using frequency

tables and ordinal probit analysis.
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Table 4.1
Experience and Certification of Subjects

All Subjects

Legislative
Auditors

Private
Practitioners

Experience

Mean

Range

Mean

Range

Mean

Range

Total
Accounting
Experience11

14.5

1-34

14.8

1-34

14.0

2-28

Governmental
Auditing
Experience3*

11.7

1-28

12.4

1-23

10.8

2-28

Continuing
Professional
Education15

55.3

0-250

57. 0

0-120

52.6

18-250

Legislative
Auditors

Private
Practitioners

Certified Public
Accountant (CPA)*

24

27

Non-CPA*

20

1

1

18

43

10

Certification Earned

Governmental Accounting
and Auditing Certificate
of Achievement (GAACEA)*
Non-GAACEA*

0 Experience variables measured in years.
b Continuing Professional Education is measured in hours in prior 24
months.
Legislative Auditors differ significantly from Private Practitioners.

For each case, subjects were asked where they would
report noncompliance with the Louisiana Local Government
Budget Act.

Subjects were instructed to select as many

reporting options as applied (see Appendix).

For the

purpose of this analysis, the reporting decision variable
was coded with the highest level of reporting circled by
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the subject for that case.

For example, if compliance

report and management letter were both circled, the
reporting decision would be coded as a compliance report.
Subjects' reporting decisions are summarized in Table 4.2.

Table 4.2
Reporting Decisions

Frequency

Percentage

206

24.4 %

Oral Communication

49

5.8 %

Management Letter

54

6.4 %

Footnotes

23

2.7 %

Compliance Report
or Opinion

512

60.7 %

Total

844

100.0 %

Reporting Decision
No Report Made

As Table 4.2 illustrates, responses were grouped
primarily on the two ends of the reporting scale, with only
14.9% falling between no reporting and the highest level of
reporting available.

This study has suggested that four

variables may influence which of the available reporting
options an auditor chooses.

Hypotheses involving budget

variance, fiscal stress, political turnover, and employment
sector were developed in Chapter 3.

The evidence

concerning each of these variables will be described
separately below, using frequency tables and chi-square
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tests.

The ordinal probit analysis will then be discussed,

followed by additional descriptive analysis of the data.

Frequency Tables
Budget Variance
The first research hypothesis, which concerned budget
variance, was as follows:
Hl0: The percentage variance from the budget will not
affect the reporting decision.
H1a: Higher percentages of unfavorable budget variance will
result in higher level noncompliance reporting.
Reporting decisions made by auditors at each budget
variance level are illustrated in Table 4.3.

The chi-

square test is highly significant (p < .01), indicating a
strong relationship between budget variance and reporting
decision.2

For example, when budget variance was four

percent, representing municipal compliance with the Budget
Act, 72.5% of the responses indicated that no report should
be made.

However, when the municipality failed to comply

with the Budget Act, all responses indicated some level of
reporting.

The reporting level was significantly higher

for the sixteen percent budget variance cases than for the
seven percent cases as well (x23 = 13 .054, p < .01).

These

results support the first research hypothesis.

2 Chi-square tests of the data in this experiment were
performed using SAS software, version 6.2, ® 1990, SAS
Institute.
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Table 4.3
Reporting Decisions by Budget Variance Level

Number of Responses
Column Percentage

4 %

7 %

16 %

206
72.5 %

0
0 %

39
13.7 %

6
2.1 %

4
1.4 %

Management Letter

18
6.3 %

28
10.0 %

8
2.9 %

Footnotes

13
4.6 %

6
2.1 %

4
1.4 %

Compliance Report
or Opinion

8
2.8 %

240
85.7 %

264
94.3 %

No Report Made
Oral Communication

Total Responses

X28 = 707.26

284

0

0 %

280

280

(p < .01)

Fiscal Stress
The second research hypothesis involved fiscal stress.
Deis and Giroux (1992) found that audit quality was
higher,and Knapp's (1985, 1987) studies implied that
auditors were less likely to be pressured into
underreporting, when fiscal stress was present.

The

findings of these studies led to the second research
hypothesis:
H20: Fiscal stress will not affect the auditor's reporting
decision.
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H2a: High (low) fiscal stress will be associated with a
higher (lower) level of noncompliance reporting.
Table 4.4 provides the reporting decisions made at
each level of fiscal stress.

The chi-square statistic is

not significant, indicating that there was no relationship
between fiscal stress and the compliance reporting
decision, thus the null hypothesis cannot be rejected.

Table 4.4
Reporting Decisions by Fiscal Stress Level

Number of Responses
Column Percentage

No
Fiscal Stress

No Report Made

High
Fiscal Stress

107
25.5 %

99
23.3 %

Oral Communication

20
4.8 %

29
6.8 %

Management Letter

28
6.7 %

26
6.1 %

Footnotes

10
2.4 %

13
3.1 %

254
60.6 %

258
60.7 %

Compliance Report
or Opinion
Total Responses

X24 = 2.42

(p > .10)

419

425
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Political Turnover
The third research hypothesis considered the impact of
political turnover on auditors' reporting decisions.
Political turnover was chosen as an indicator of the
political environment, because it was believed that an
incumbent mayor would be more likely to resist disclosure
than someone who had just entered office after a
competitive election.

This led to the third research

hypothesis:
H30: Political turnover will not affect the auditor's
reporting decision.
H3a: Political turnover will be associated with a higher
level of noncompliance reporting.
Reporting decisions at each level of political
turnover are shown in Table 4.5.

As with fiscal stress,

the chi-cguare test did not indicate any relationship
between political turnover and auditor reporting decisions.
Again, the results fail to reject the null hypothesis.

Employment Sector
Subjects in the experiment were either private
practitioners or legislative auditors.

Kropatkin and

Forrester (1983) noted that private sector auditors are
perceived to be client advocates whereas federal auditors
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Table 4.5
Reporting Decisions by Political Turnover

Number of Responses
Column Percentage

Incumbent
Mayor

Political
Turnover

104
25.5 %

102
24.3 %

Oral Communication

27
6.4 %

22
5.2 %

Management Letter

27
6.4 %

27
6.4 %

Footnotes

10
2.4 %

13
3.1 %

256
60.4 %

256
61.0 %

No Report Made

Compliance Report
or Opinion
Total Responses

X24 — 0.90

424

420

(p > .10)

are perceived to seek out problems for disclosure.
perception is correct,

If this

legislative auditors should be

expected to report noncompliance at higher levels:
H40: Group membership will not affect the auditor's
reporting decision.
H4a: Legislative auditors will use higher levels of
noncompliance reporting than will private
practitioners.
Reporting decisions of the two groups of auditors are
depicted in Table 4.6.

There is a highly significant

relationship between employment sector of the subjects and
reporting decisions (p < .01).

This result supports

hypothesis H4A.

Additional hypotheses concerning

employment sector will be considered in the discussion of
the ordinal probit model.

Table 4.6
Reporting Decisions by Employment Sector

Number of Responses
Column Percentage

Legislative
Auditors

No Report Made

Private
Practitioners

125
24.3 %

81
24.6 %

Oral Communication

31
6.0 %

18
5.5 %

Management Letter

18
3.5 %

36
10.9 %

Footnotes

9
1.8 %

14
4.2 %

331
64.4 %

181
54.9 %

Compliance Report
or Opinion
Total Responses

X24 = 24.95

514

330

(p < .01)

Ordinal Probit Analysis
The chi-square analysis in the previous section
established that a relationship existed between reporting
decisions and budget variance as well as employment sector.
However, a complete model of the compliance reporting
decisions is needed to test these relationships
simultaneously as well as to test the interactions between
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employment sector and the remaining variables.

The model

to be tested is as follows3:
RD = f (BV, FS, PT, 6/ 6 X BV, G X FS, G X PT)
where RD = Reporting Decision (6 levels)
BV = Budget Variance (3 levels)
FS = Fiscal Stress (2 levels)
PT = Political Turnover (2 levels)
G

= Group / Employment Sector (2 groups)

The full model was tested using ordinal probit
analysis, which estimates a linear model for an ordered
categorical dependent variable (McKelvey and Zavoina,
1975).

Maximum likelihood estimates of the coefficients

for each variable, as well as for the threshold parameters,
/zj, were obtained.

The results are presented in Table 4.7.

A chi-square test statistic is computed from the log
likelihood ratio to test the significance of the overall
model, and t-ratios are used to test the significance of
individual parameters.
significant.

The overall model is highly

Specifically, the ordinal probit results

concur with the results of the frequency tables, in that
budget variance and employment sector are found to be

3 Ordinal probit analysis of the model was performed
using LIMDEP software, ® 1991, William Greene, Econometric
Software, Inc.
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Table 4.7
Ordinal Probit of Reporting Decision on Budget Variance,
Fiscal Stress, Political Turnover, Employment Sector,
and Employment Sector Interactions

Variable

Coefficient

t - ratio

- 4.978

- 14.155**

Budget Variance

1.065

16.184**

Fiscal Stress

0.167

0.985

Intercept

Political Turnover
Employment Sector

- 0.004

-

4 .069

0.025
10. 318**

Employment Sector x
Budget Variance

- 0.833

—

Employment Sector x
Fiscal Stress

- 0.094

—

Employment Sector x
Political Turnover

0.046

0. 208

Mi

0.378

6.766**

M2

0.827

10. 169**

Ms

1.013

10.614**

X27 = 679.09**

*»

12.801**
0. 429

p < .01

significant determinants of reporting decisions while
fiscal stress and political turnover are not.
Legislative auditors reported violations of the Budget
Act at a higher level than did private practitioners.

This

finding supports the perception that legislative auditors
disclose noncompliance more readily, but it also suggests
that they may consider noncompliance with the Budget Act
significant at any level, whereas private practitioners
judge the materiality of the noncompliance in making a

reporting decision.

If so, the two groups would respond to

the budget variance factor differently.

In addition,

legislative auditors should be unaffected by other
variables such as fiscal stress and political turnover.

By

contrast, private practitioners may consider these factors
because of pressures that would be brought to bear against
them in client conflict situations.

The following

hypotheses reflect these expectations:
H4b: Group membership will have a significant interaction
with budget variance in determining the level of
noncompliance reporting.
H4C: Fiscal stress will affect the level of noncompliance
reporting for private practitioners but not for
legislative auditors.
H4d: Political turnover will affect the level of
noncompliance reporting for private practitioners but
not for legislative auditors.
In the ordinal probit model, the employment sector x
budget variance interaction is significant.
Hypothesis 4B.

This supports

However, the employment sector interactions

with fiscal stress and political turnover are not
significant, and therefore Hypotheses 4C and 4D are not
supported.

Fiscal stress and political turnover were

expected to impact the reporting decision because of the
implications for auditor independence.

The fact that

neither was significant, alone or in conjunction with
employment sector, implies that the auditors did not
consider the pressures against them or believed such
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pressures would not affect their reporting decisions.

The

significance of the budget variance x employment sector
interaction, however, adds additional support to the notion
that legislative auditors and private practitioners have
different approaches to reporting noncompliance.
The ordinal probit model did not perform perfectly.
When applying the coefficient estimates to the actual data,
the misclassification rate was 15.9%.

In a small number of

cases where no report was expected, subjects chose to
disclose noncompliance.

However, misclassification

occurred primarily because the model predicted that all
responses would fall into the two extreme categories, no
report or compliance report.

Therefore, all cases in which

the subject chose oral communication, management letter, or
footnotes were misclassified.
Separate ordinal probit models for each employment
sector group were also estimated, excluding the employment
sector variable and all interactions.
presented in Table 4.8.

These models are

As the overall model indicated,

only budget variance was significant for either group.
Although both models are highly significant, the model for
the legislative auditors has a notably lower
misclassification rate of 12.1%, compared to 21.8% for the
private practitioners.
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Table 4.8
Ordinal Probit of Reporting Decision on Budget Variance,
Fiscal Stress, and Political Turnover

1

Legislative Auditors

|

Coefficient

Variable
Constant

t - ratio

- 5.069

- 14.141**

Budget Variance

1.097

15. 147**

Fiscal Stress

0.170

1.037

Political Turnover

- 0.004

-

0.023

Mi

0.516

5. 209**

fl2

0.914

6. 587**

fX3

1.160

6.02 6**

X23 = 474.57“
Private Practitioners
Variable
Constant

Coefficient
- 0.932

t - ratio
-

5.253“

Budget Variance

0.226

12.980“

Fiscal Stress

0.070

0.482

Political Turnover

0.040

0.277

Mi

0.272

4.391“

m2

0.753

7.529”

Ms

0.916

8.335“

X23 = 186.59“

” p < .01

To investigate why the interaction of employment
sector and budget variance is significant, the data for
each group need to be analyzed.

Table 4.9 presents the

reporting decisions of the legislative auditors and private
practitioners separately at each level of budget variance.
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Table 4.9
Reporting Decision by Budget Variance
and Employment Sector

Legislative Auditors
Frequency
Column %

4% Budget
Variance

7 % Budget
Variance

16% Budget
Variance

No Report

125
72.5 %

0

0

Oral
Communication

23
13.3 %

4
2.3 %

4
2.3 %

Management
Letter

12
6.9 %

6
3.5 %

0

Footnotes

9
5.2 %

0

0

Compliance Report
or Opinion

4
2.3 %

Total

173

160
94.1 %
170

167
97.7 %
171

X28 = 455.01Private Practitioners
Frequency
Column %

4% Budget
Variance

7% Budget
Variance

16% Budget
Variance

No Report

81
73.0 %

0

0

Oral
Communication

16
14.4 %

2
1.8 %

0

Management
Letter

6
5.4 %

22
20.0 %

8
7.3 %

Footnotes

4
3.6 %

6
5.5 %

4
3.7 %

Compliance Report
or Opinion

4
3.6 %

80
72.7 %

97
89.0 %

Total

111

X28 = 280.74-

110

109
p < .01
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The table illustrates that for most subjects, if the budget
variance was four percent, i.e., if the municipality was
not in violation of the Budget Act, auditors would not
report non-compliance.
However, at seven percent budget variance, the private
practitioners reported at a lower level than legislative
auditors.

Only six percent of the legislative auditors

reported noncompliance below the compliance report, whereas
twenty-seven percent of the private practitioners did.
Most notably, twenty percent of private practitioners chose
to report noncompliance in a management letter, whereas
only 3.5% of legislative auditors chose this option.

The

same held true for cases with sixteen percent budget
variance, although the difference between the two groups
was less marked.
In general, legislative auditors seemed to see the
issue as black and white:

if the client was in compliance

with the law, there was no reporting, or at most there was
only oral communication with the client about the budget
variance.

If, on the other hand, the municipality did not

comply with the Budget Act (variance of '7% or 16%) ,
disclosure was made in the Compliance Report or in the
Opinion on the Financial Statements.
In contrast, private practitioners tended to report at
a lower level.

Many of these subjects reported

noncompliance in the footnotes or in a management letter,
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especially with budget variance of seven percent, rather
than disclosing noncompliance in the Compliance Report or
the Opinion.

Private practitioners apparently judged the

materiality of the noncompliance in making a reporting
decision, whereas legislative auditors judged all
noncompliance with the Budget Act as significant enough to
include in the compliance report.

CONSENSUS
The final research hypothesis concerned consensus
among governmental auditors.

The longer governmental

auditing experience of the legislative auditors should lead
to more subspecialty expertise (Ashton, 1991) and therefore
to higher consensus (Bonner and Lewis, 1990).

Further,

more experience within an organization should also result
in more consensus (Meixner and Welker, 1988).

This led to

the final research hypothesis:
H4e: Legislative auditors will show higher consensus in
noncompliance reporting than will private
practitioners.
Consensus in reporting was measured using Pearson's
product-moment correlation coefficients.

The reporting

decisions of each auditor were correlated to the decisions
of every other auditor, such that the correlations for each
possible pair of subjects were determined.

Following

Ashton (1974) and Meixner and Welker (1988) the mean of
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these coefficients was then computed as a measure of
overall consensus in reporting among subjects.

The mean

correlation of .943 demonstrates very high consensus,
particularly in comparison to prior accounting research.4
Of interest in this research is whether the consensus
among legislative auditors is higher than among private
practitioners.

The correlations between all possible pairs

of legislative auditors resulted in a mean correlation of
.975, with a minimum correlation of .697 and maximum of
1.0.

The mean correlation among all possible pairs of

private practitioners was .896, with minimum correlation of
.544 and maximum of 1.0.

Although the consensus within

each group was quite high, the mean correlation of the
legislative audit group was significantly higher than that
of the private practitioner group (p < .01).

This

supports the final hypotheses, H4E, that the legislative
auditors would show higher consensus than the private
practitioners.

STATISTICAL LIMITATIONS
The interpretation of the results is limited by a few
factors.

First, the subjects were not selected at random,

limiting the generalizability of the conclusions beyond the

4 For example, Ashton (1974) and Meixner and Welker
(1988) found mean correlations of .70, .373, and .73,
respectively, among auditors making internal control
judgments.
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participants.

Similarly, the possibility of non-response

bias must be considered.

Responses of subjects who

returned completed instruments after the initial request
were compared to those returned after additional prompting.
The early and late groups did not differ significantly
either in chi-square tests or when a dummy variable was
added to the ordinal probit model.

Therefore it is not

expected that nonrespondents would have differed from
respondents in their reporting decisions.
Second, the letter from the Legislative Auditor may
have influenced the results of the experiment.

The letter

was included to increase participation, and the high
response rate suggests that the letter was successful.
However, the letter may have caused some subjects to
respond as they believed the Legislative Auditor wanted
them to rather than as they would in a real audit, despite
assurances that responses and names of participants would
be kept confidential.

The letter may also have altered the

auditors' perceptions of the importance of the Louisiana
Local Government Budget Act.

COMPARISON TO ACTUAL AUDIT DATA
In the development of this study, a sample of 100
annual reports of municipalities and parishes in Louisiana
were examined.

Management letters that had been submitted

to the Legislative Auditor, as required in the engagement
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letters, were also made available.

As required by

Generally Accepted Accounting Principles for governments,
these financial statements compared actual revenues and
expenditures to the respective budgeted amounts.

Budgets

were presented as amended, and therefore compliance with
the Louisiana Local Government Budget Act could be
determined.
Noncompliance with the Budget Act was commonplace
among the municipalities sampled.

Of the 100 reports

examined, 40 revealed budget variances in excess of five
percent.5

Reporting practices in the haphazard sample

were markedly different from those found in this study.
Although fiscal stress and political turnover were not
determined, and all but two of the audits were performed by
private practitioners, the response to budget variance bore
virtually no resemblance to the experimental responses.
Among the 100 sampled municipal and parish reports, there
was no significant relationship between budget variance and
noncompliance reporting.

Table 4.10 presents the data from

the haphazard sample.
In the experiment, most subjects reported any
violation of the Budget Act (all cases with budget variance
over five percent)

in the Compliance Report.

In the

archival sample, numerous cases of noncompliance went
5 For the purposes of this discussion, budget variance
refers to actual versus budgeted total expenditures for the
General Fund.
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Table 4.10
Budget Variance Versus Compliance Reporting Decisions:
Haphazard Sample of 100 Municipalities

Reporting
Decision"

Mean
Budget Variance

Range of Actual
Budget Variance

No Report

7.1 %

0.2 - 27.4 %

Management Letter

1.7 %

(only one report)

Footnotes

14.6 %

11.0 - 16.7 %

Compliance Report

17.6 %

5.4 - 41.5 %

“Highest reporting level used, e.g., if noncompliance was reported in
the Compliance Report and a Management Letter, it is included in the
Compliance Report figures.

unreported.

To illustrate that these findings were not the

result of isolated exceptions, Table 4.11 presents the
frequency with which noncompliance was reported or not
reported, with municipalities divided into ranges of budget
variance.

As indicated by the nonsignificant chi-square

value, there was no difference among the levels of budget
variance in the proportion of cases reported versus not
reported.
This striking finding has a number of possible
explanations.

The sample of actual reports studied was not

random, and therefore may not be representative of all
municipal audits in Louisiana.

It is possible that

noncompliance with the Budget Act is reported more
frequently in general.

Participants in the study were not

selected at random either, and it is possible that the
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subjects tended to report at higher levels than the
population of governmental auditors would.

Table 4.11
Compliance Reporting among Sample Municipalities

Frequency
Row Percentage

Noncompliance
Reported”

Noncompliance
Not Reported

5 - 10 %
Budget Variance

4
24 %

13
76 %

10 - 15 %
Budget Variance

2
20 %

8
80 %

15 - 20 %
Budget Variance

2
25 %

6
75 %

over 20 %
Budget Variance

3
60 %

2
40 %

Total

11

29

X23 = 3 .091

(p 5> .10)

“Noncompliance was considered reported if it was noted in the
footnotes, the compliance report, the report on internal controls, or
the opinion on the financial statements.

It seems likely, however, that the explanation for the
difference between the experimental results and the actual
audit data is not strictly an experimental artifact.

As an

initial investigation into compliance reporting decisions,
this experiment was far less complex than an actual audit,
by design.

Municipal auditors must evaluate compliance

with numerous laws and regulations simultaneously, and it
is possible that the Budget Act gets overlooked or is
considered less important than other laws with more
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potential impact on the financial statements.

It is also

likely that auditor independence is subject to more
pressure in an actual audit than in this experiment, and
auditor compromise may result in less frequent
noncompliance reporting.

These issues will be addressed

further in the final discussion chapter of this
dissertation.

SUMMARY
The statistical analysis discussed in this chapter
demonstrates a few strong trends.

Consensus among auditors

was quite high, especially within the Legislative Audit
group.

The two groups of subjects, legislative auditors

and private practitioners, both made reporting decisions
based on budget variance but reacted to it somewhat
differently.

Though all subjects reported all cases of

noncompliance, private practitioners reported it at a lower
level on average.
For many of the participants in the study, the Budget
Act cases presented were clear cut.

If the municipality

had not violated the Louisiana Local Government Budget Act,
there was no need to report or even discuss noncompliance
with the client.

However, if noncompliance did occur, they

reported it directly on the Compliance Report.
subjects followed this strategy, however.

Not all

Many private

practitioners used a lower level of reporting when the
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budget variance was seven percent, an amount where
materiality may be questionable.
Lastly, none of the subjects was influenced by the
fiscal stress or political turnover variables.

This

contradicts the findings of prior research (Deis and
Giroux, 1992; Baber, 1990), and may suggest that
independence impairment cannot be induced in an experiment
of this nature.

It is also possible, however, that because

of the frequency of qualified opinions in governmental
audits (Lynn and Gaffney, 1990), municipal clients may not
resist disclosure, mitigating such pressures against
auditors.

CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION
The Louisiana Local Government Budget Act requires
that municipalities adopt an annual budget through the
political process.

If it becomes apparent that a

municipality will exceed budgeted expenditures by five
percent or more, a budget amendment must be adopted through
that same political process, or the municipality is in
noncompliance with the Budget Act.

Government Auditing

Standards require that governmental entities be audited not
just for fair presentation in the financial statements, but
also for compliance with applicable laws and regulations.
If noncompliance that has a material effect on the
financial statements is found, the auditor is required to
disclose it in the Compliance Report, one of the three
reports issued by the auditor in a governmental engagement.
This study tested whether fiscal stress, political
turnover, and employment sector impact the compliance
reporting decisions of governmental auditors faced with
varying degrees of noncompliance with the Louisiana Local
Government Budget Act.

Budget variance, employment sector,

and the interaction between the two factors were highly
significant.

Fiscal stress, political turnover, and their

interactions with employment sector were all found to be
statistically insignificant.

In this chapter, the research
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findings, practical implications of the results, and
questions raised will be discussed.

RESEARCH FINDINGS
Budget Variance
The Louisiana Local Government Budget Act requires
that a municipal budget be amended only if expenditures
exceed the budget by five percent or more, and therefore
cases with only four percent budget variance are in
compliance with the Budget Act.

Accordingly, most auditors

did not report noncompliance when the budget variance was
four percent.

When the budget variance was seven or

sixteen percent and the municipality failed to adopt a
budget amendment, most auditors found some level of
noncompliance reporting appropriate.

However, once the

budget variance exceeded the five percent threshold, there
was less unanimity as to the appropriate level of
reporting.
Some auditors reported noncompliance directly on the
Compliance Report whether the variance was seven percent or
sixteen percent.

These auditors apparently used a "black

or white" decision strategy, whereby municipalities
complying with the Budget Act were not reported for the
four percent variance, and municipalities not complying
with the Act were reported at the highest level.

Other

auditors reported the sixteen percent variance cases on the
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Compliance Report but used lower level disclosure choices,
such as footnotes or management letters, for the seven
percent cases.
Recall that Government Auditing Standards require that
instances of noncompliance with a material impact on the
financial statements be reported.

Those subjects who

reported at a lower level for seven percent than for
sixteen percent variance apparently had a materiality
threshold between these two points, above which
noncompliance was reported on the Compliance Report, but
below which noncompliance was disclosed at a less visible
level.

Those who reported both seven percent and sixteen

percent on the Compliance Report, however, may have
considered both levels to be material noncompliance, or
they may have considered any violation of the Budget Act
significant enough in its own right to warrant reporting,
regardless of materiality.
Materiality studies that have focused on private
sector audits have found five to ten percent of net income
to be the materiality threshold (Holstrum and Messier,
1982) .

Although net income is not completely analogous to

budget variance,

it seems reasonable to expect that a

similar materiality threshold of five to ten percent would
be found in the governmental arena as well.

Therefore the

finding that seven percent budget variance was considered
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material by some auditors but not by others concurs with
prior audit judgment research.

Employment Sector
Until July, 1991, local governments in Louisiana could
engage auditors from either the private sector or from the
Office of the Legislative Auditor.

Legislative audit staff

were expected to make different reporting decisions from
private practitioners for a few reasons.

First, the

Legislative Audit staff are specialists in governmental
accounting and may have more sub-specialty knowledge in
auditing for compliance with laws and regulations.

By

contrast, certified public accountants in the private
sector, whether self-employed or working for larger
accounting firms, are likely to have a mixture of
governmental and business clients, and they may be less
knowledgeable about compliance issues.
Auditors in the private sector come from many firms
from all over the state of Louisiana.

They work for firms

that have different priorities in continued training, in
client retention, and in industry specialization.

On the

other hand, staff members for the Legislative Auditor
specialize in governmental accounting and auditing.

They

work under established bureaucratic procedures, and they
receive similar training in governmental auditing.

These
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factors again may lead to increased sub-specialty knowledge
among the legislative audit group.
Finally, differences between these two groups may
arise from different perceptions of their roles as
auditors.

Kropatkin and Forrester (1983) observed that

auditors employed in the private sector tend to paint the
best possible picture of their clients, whereas auditors
who are public employees tend to focus on seeking out
errors in the auditee's records.

This observation may

result from a different outlook on the part of the auditors
as to who their clients actually are in a governmental
engagement.
As private practitioners, private sector auditors are
accustomed to working with the management team of a client
company to achieve an acceptable balance between full
disclosure and client retention.

They are also accustomed

to making reporting decisions in light of materiality
judgments.

Conversely, as public employees who may view

themselves as the public watchdogs, legislative auditors
may consider the public at large —

and not municipal

administrators or political leaders —

as the ultimate

clients whose interests must be considered.

Without the

possibility of partnership and personal shares of client
revenues, they have less incentive to appease a client by
lowering the level of disclosure.

They may also be
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accustomed to judging compliance itself, rather than making
materiality judgments where noncompliance is concerned.
Legislative auditors reported noncompliance at higher
levels than did private practitioners, members of the two
groups responded differently to the budget variance levels,
and there was higher consensus among legislative auditors
than among private practitioners.

These findings resulted

primarily from reporting decisions for cases with budget
variance of seven percent.
At four percent and sixteen percent budget variance,
reporting decisions were similar between the two groups.
For the most part, private and public sector auditors
reported nothing at four percent and disclosed
noncompliance on the Compliance Report at sixteen percent.
However, although most legislative auditors reported seven
percent budget variance on the Compliance Report, many
private sector auditors reported seven percent budget
variance at lower levels, such as in footnotes or
management letters.

This was not always the case, though,

as some private sector auditors did report seven percent
budget variance on the Compliance Report.

This explains

the finding that there was less consensus among private
practitioners (.896) than among legislative auditors
(.975), although the consensus was quite high for both
groups.
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Fiscal Stress
Fiscal stress was found not to impact the reporting
decisions of the subjects in this experiment.

This result

is contrary to the findings of prior accounting research,
which has found that audit quality was higher (Deis and
Giroux, 1992) and that auditors were perceived to be likely
to be pressured into underreporting when fiscal stress was
present (Knapp, 1985).
The relationship between auditor judgments and fiscal
stress has been explained as due to impaired auditor
independence.

If this is the correct interpretation, the

lack of significance here may result from the experimental
method used in this study.

In a mailed experiment, where

subjects are not required to interact with clients and are
not concerned about future revenues, pressures against
independence are difficult to duplicate.

Even if such

pressures were simulated in the experiment, subjects may
not have considered how fiscal stress would affect their
power vis a vis the client.

Finally, the perceptions of

Knapp's (1985, 1987) subjects may have been incorrect, and
the correlation between audit quality and financial health
found by Deis and Giroux (1992) may not extend to
compliance reporting decisions.
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Political Turnover
Political turnover was chosen as an indicator of the
political environment of the municipality, because it was
believed that an incumbent mayor would be more likely to
resist disclosure than someone who had just entered office
after a competitive election, in which the budget may have
been an issue.

There was no evidence that political

turnover had any effect on compliance reporting decisions.
Auditors may not have appreciated the role of
accounting information in the political environment or they
may not have considered how turnover might affect the
pressure they would receive to underreport noncompliance.
Perhaps other political variables, such as a pre-election
(rather than post-election) fiscal year, an upcoming tax
referendum, or some other variable would have affected
auditor reporting decisions.

Comparison to Actual Audit Data
The difference between the actual data sample and the
experimental results raises a number of questions.
Auditors in the haphazard sample may not have been as
familiar with the Louisiana Local Government Budget Act as
were the participants in the study.

Municipalities are

subject to so many laws and regulations that auditors may
not be familiar with all of them.

If this is the case,

however, auditors may not be following due diligence.

To
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perform an audit in accordance with Government Auditing
Standards, auditors are required to obtain an understanding
of laws generally recognized by auditors to have an effect
on the financial statements (AICPA, 1989).

The Budget Act

is one of the pieces of legislation highlighted in the
Louisiana Governmental Audit Guide (Society of Louisiana
Certified Public Accountants,

1988), indicating such

general recognition.
Is the failure to report an indication of lack of
awareness of the Budget Act, or do auditors not consider
violations of the Budget Act material to the financial
statements?

If auditors are not aware of the act, the

answer must be to enforce Continuing Professional Education
(CPE) requirements of auditors wishing to perform municipal
audits.

If the latter is the case, why would auditors not

find even extreme violations material in actual audits yet
consider them reportable in the experiment?
One answer to this question is that in the context of
an actual municipal audit, where many laws and regulations
must be considered simultaneously, the Budget Act may not
receive the same focused attention that it did in this
study.

Auditors who are familiar with the Budget Act may

choose to emphasize laws which have a clearly material
impact on the statements or laws that, if broken, have
serious legal ramifications.
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Noncompliance with the Budget Act may leave the
municipality subject to a court-imposed freeze against any
additional extra-budgeted expenditures, but by the time the
audit is being performed, the municipality has generally
moved into the next fiscal year with a new budget in place.
The possibility of legal action is remote, and legal
liability for the auditor is unlikely.

Therefore, auditors

may feel that the comparative presentation of budgeted
versus actual revenues and expenditures, required by
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles,
address the Budget Act.

is sufficient to

The lack of comparative figures in

the experimental instrument may have increased the use of
high level compliance reporting.
The letter from the Legislative Auditor, included in
the experimental instrument to increase participation, also
may have led subjects to respond at a higher level.
Although subjects were guaranteed anonymity, they may have
responded as they thought they should rather than as they
would in an actual audit.

Additionally, pressures against

independence were likely not simulated successfully in this
study.

In a client conflict situation, auditors may

compromise with the client by agreeing to address budget
variance only in the comparative statements rather than
specifically reporting noncompliance with the Budget Act.
Finally, in the context of a real audit, other factors not
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captured or manipulated here may affect the reporting
decision process.

Summary
Sixty-eight governmental auditors participated in an
experiment focusing on municipal adherence to the Louisiana
Local Government Budget Act, to determine how budget
variance, fiscal stress, political turnover, and employment
sector affected auditors' noncompliance reporting
decisions.

Among the participants in this study, budget

variance was the most significant factor in reporting
decisions.

The majority of subjects reported any

noncompliance with the Budget Act directly in the
Compliance Report.

However, reporting patterns were

different for auditors employed in the private sector than
for auditors employed by the Legislative Auditor of
Louisiana, with the legislative auditors reporting at a
higher level on average.
At the lowest level of budget variance (4 percent),
and the highest level (16 percent), reporting patterns of
the two groups were essentially the same:

four percent

does not violate the Budget Act, so most auditors did not
report noncompliance anywhere;

sixteen percent was

considered by most auditors to be material noncompliance,
and was generally reported in the Compliance Report.
difference between the two groups was significant when

The
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budget variance was seven percent, however.

Legislative

Audit staff reported noncompliance on the Compliance Report
in such cases, whereas many private sector auditors
reported noncompliance in a management letter or in the
footnotes when budget variance was seven percent.
For the vast majority of auditors, neither fiscal
stress nor political turnover had a significant impact on
noncompliance reporting decisions.

Political turnover did

not impact the reporting decisions of a single participant
in this experiment.

However, a small number of auditors

did choose higher reporting levels if fiscal stress was
present than if it was absent.

It seems likely, given the

overwhelming significance of budget variance, that auditors
would not alter their judgments regardless of the political
environment of the budget.

Fiscal stress and political

turnover, or some other indicator of the political
environment, may have more of an impact on auditor
reporting decisions if the compliance issue were a law or
regulation with less clear-cut boundaries between
compliance and noncompliance.
Finally, consensus among auditors was quite high.
Legislative auditors were in almost complete agreement as
to where and when noncompliance should be reported.
Consensus among private practitioners was somewhat lower
but was still quite high.

This reduced consensus is

attributable primarily to agreement among legislative
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auditors but variability among private practitioners as to
where seven percent variance cases should be reported.

LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
Compliance auditing has not been the subject of much
academic research to date, particularly behavioral
research.

Before complex decisions can be analyzed, some

of the basic assumptions about reporting decisions must be
tested.

As a result, this study was quite simplistic in

comparison to the contextually rich environment of
governmental auditing.

Focusing on only one law made it

easy for the subjects to attend to that law and evaluate
compliance.

This may have caused subjects to report

noncompliance more commonly than they would in practice.
The subjects of this study were not selected at
random.

Therefore, any findings as to the significance of

budget variance, employment sector, fiscal stress, and
political turnover are statistically valid only among the
subjects, and conclusions about the importance of these
factors to governmental auditors in general must be made
with caution.

The differential response rate between the

two groups may also have heightened the significance of the
employment sector variable.
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CONTRIBUTIONS
This experiment is one of the first to investigate
specifically the decision making of governmental auditors.
The quality of governmental audits has been a concern of
the U.S. government and the AICPA for the past decade, but
it is only beginning to receive attention in the academic
literature.

There has been extensive research into the

decisions of auditors in areas such as internal control
evaluations, materiality judgments, and even reporting, but
these studies have focused on the audits of private sector
businesses.
This study extends previous research by considering
governmental auditing and the added role auditors play in
evaluating compliance with laws and regulations.

The

Louisiana Local Government Budget Act was chosen for this
study because it is directly relevant to the financial
statements, and auditors should be familiar with the
content and the importance of municipal budgets.
The participants in this study reflected an
understanding of the law in their reporting decisions, but
there were clearly differences between how private
practitioners and legislative auditors chose to disclose
noncompliance with the Budget Act.

This lends support to

the increasing notion in accounting research that it is
sub-specialty knowledge, not length of experience, which
leads to expertise in audit judgment.

It also suggests
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that legislative auditors are more compliance oriented than
private practitioners.
The practical implications of these findings are
potentially significant.

The Office of the Legislative

Auditor was permitted to bid on municipal audits in
Louisiana until 1991, when complaints of unfair competition
led the Louisiana Legislature to restrict bidding on
municipal audits to private practitioners.

This legal

shift has improved opportunities in governmental auditing
for small audit firms.

However, if private practitioners

do not place the same emphasis on compliance issues, it may
result in lowered audit quality.

It is possible that the

problems of poor quality governmental audits discovered on
the federal level in the 1980s will threaten the value and
reliability of audited financial statements at the local
level of government.
Conversely, the Yellow Book requires auditors to
report noncompliance only if it is material to the
financial statements.

If legislative auditors report all

instances of noncompliance, they may be exceeding the
requirements and even the intent of GAS reporting
standards.

Users of audit reports may have difficulty

extracting the most important pieces of information from an
all-inclusive report.

Future audit standards and

interpretations should clarify the relationship between
materiality and noncompliance as well as the role of

126

significant, but nonmaterial, items in the compliance
report.

DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
The differences between the haphazard sample and the
experimental results are striking and suggest the need for
further investigation of actual reporting decisions as well
as further experimentation.

It would be worthwhile to

select a random sample, or even the full population of
municipal annual reports, and look for factors that may be
influencing reporting decisions.

Such factors could

include those tested in this study as well as others
investigated in future experiments.
The results of this study indicate that employment
sector plays a role in the differences in reporting
decisions.

Future research should examine whether this

difference is due to subspecialty knowledge, uniform
management, approaches to compliance reporting in general,
or some combination of the three.

The answer to this

question would surely raise additional questions, such as
how sub-specialty knowledge is attained and how it can be
measured.

Discovering the extent to which sub-specialty

knowledge in combination with other personal factors
affects judgments in governmental auditing as well as other
accounting disciplines will enable researchers to work with
practitioners to improve the quality of public accounting.

If a different view of the role of governmental
auditors drives the finding of group differences, the
profession must consider which approach best serves the
needs of financial statement users and provide more
specific guidance.

Finally, if the result stems from the

uniform training and management, it may be necessary for
the AICPA to standardize CPE in the governmental field to
overcome the historically poor quality of governmental
audits.
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(504) 767-3235. If you would like a copy of the results of this study, please mark "yes" on
the enclosed postcard. Thank you for your assistance.
Sincerely,

Daniel Q. Kyle, CPA
Legislative Auditor

DGK/LK/db
Enclosures
VMwaft

138

INTRODUCTION
You have been engaged as the external auditor for the
town of Pemberton, Louisiana.
This exercise will ask you
to make compliance reporting decisions as part of your
audit of Pemberton.
The law considered in this exercise is
the Louisiana Local Government Budget Act.
Pemberton may
or may not be in violation of the Act.
Pemberton has a population of 4600. According to the
1990 U.S. Census, a town of this size would be larger than
approximately 78% of the towns in Louisiana.
Pemberton has
a mayor-council form of government.
Pemberton has annual
General Fund expenditures exceeding $250,000, making it
subject to the Louisiana Local Government Budget Act.
Over
the past ten-year period, approximately 75% of Pemberton's
General Fund revenues have come from local sales taxes.
Although state grants and shared revenues have been
significant for funding capital projects, they have
accounted for less than 5% of the General Fund revenues in
the past ten years.
The state of Louisiana requires Pemberton to submit
audited GAAP-basis financial statements every year.
The
town receives less than $100,000 in federal aid each year,
so a Single Audit is not necessary.
Therefore, the audit
is to be performed in accordance with Government Auditing
Standards.
Sixteen cases have been developed concerning your
audit of Pemberton.
Please consider each case
independently.
The next page of this booklet contains
instructions, followed by a description of seven possible
conditions that might exist in each of the cases.
Each
case contains a different set of three of these seven
conditions.
The identifying words for each condition have
been highlighted within the descriptions.
A summary of the Louisiana Local Government Budget Act
is included with this exercise.
You may refer to the
summary of the Act as well as the list of conditions as
often as you feel necessary.
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INSTRUCTIONS
This exercise contains sixteen audit cases for the
hypothetical town of Pemberton, Louisiana.
For each case
you will be asked for your compliance reporting decision
regarding the Louisiana Local Government Budget Act.
Record your answers to each of the questions by circling
the number that reflects your answer.
Please answer all
questions for each case and for the brief questionnaire
that follows.
Consider each case independently.
Please do
not refer back to cases you have already completed, and do
not discuss the exercise with your colleagues, as this may
affect their responses to the cases.
There are no right or wrong answers.
Your responses
will be kept strictly confidential.
Your individual
responses will not be discussed with anyone, and any data
gathered from this exercise will be presented only in
summary form.
When you have completed the exercise, please return it
in the enclosed stamped, pre-addressed envelope.
In
addition to returning the cases, please send your name and
address separately on the enclosed postcard, indicating
whether or not you would like to receive a summary of the
results when this study has been completed.
Thank you very much for your assistance with this
project.
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POSSIBLE CONDITIONS FOR EACH CASE
In auditing for compliance with the Louisiana Local
Government Budget Act, you have discovered that Pemberton
EXCEEDED its budgeted General Fund expenditures BY 4% WITHOUT
AMENDING THE BUDGET.
In auditing for compliance with the Louisiana Local
Government Budget Act, you have discovered that Pemberton
EXCEEDED its budgeted General Fund expenditures BY 7% WITHOUT
AMENDING THE BUDGET.
In auditing for compliance with the Louisiana Local
Government Budget Act, you have discovered that Pemberton
EXCEEDED its budgeted General Fund expenditures BY 16%
WITHOUT AMENDING THE BUDGET.
As far as you are able to determine, EMPLOYMENT LEVELS
and TAX REVENUES in Pemberton are expected to be FAIRLY
STABLE in the foreseeable future.
You have determined that two years ago, a MAJOR EMPLOYER
in the area CLOSED.
Indications are that this closure has
led to REDUCED LOCAL SPENDING and a SERIOUS EROSION IN SALES
TAX REVENUES.
The MAYOR of this town is a POPULAR INCUMBENT serving
his third term.
During the year for which you are auditing the financial
statements, the voters of Pemberton elected a NEW MAYOR who
defeated the incumbent in a HIGHLY COMPETITIVE ELECTION.
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SUMMARY OF THE LOUISIANA LOCAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET ACT
L.S.A.-R.S. 39:1301 - 1316
The following summary contains excerpts from the Louisiana
Local Government Budget Act (hereafter "The Act"). This
summary is not all-inclusive, but contains the information
necessary to complete the experiment.
The Act applies to all political subdivisions in the state
with a general fund with proposed expenditures totaling at
least $250,000.
Each political subdivision must prepare a comprehensive
budget presenting the complete financial plan for the
ensuing fiscal year for each fund.
The budget document must include a consolidated statement
showing beginning fund balances, estimates of receipts and
revenues, recommended expenditures, and estimated ending
fund balances.
Political subdivisions with total proposed expenditures of
at least $250,000 must afford the public an opportunity to
participate in the budgetary process prior to adoption of
the budget.
When there has been a change in operations, such that
actual expenditures plus projected expenditures within a
given fund are exceeding the budget by five percent or
more, the governing authority must adopt a budget amendment
in an open meeting.
The adopted budget and any duly authorized amendments
constitute the authority of the officers to incur
liabilities and authorize expenditures.
In the event of violations of The Act, any person may
commence a suit for mandamus, injunctive, or declaratory
relief to require compliance with the provisions of this
Act.

142
SAMPLE CASE A

In auditing for compliance with the Louisiana Local
Government Budget Act, you have discovered that Pemberton
EXCEEDED its budgeted General Fund expenditures BY 4%
WITHOUT AMENDING THE BUDGET.
As far as you are able to determine, EMPLOYMENT LEVELS
and TAX REVENUES in Pemberton are expected to be FAIRLY
STABLE in the foreseeable future.
The MAYOR of this town is a POPULAR INCUMBENT serving
his third term.

In light of the information you have, would you report
noncompliance with the Local Government Budget Act?
YES

NO

If you answered YES, where would you report
noncompliance with the Budget Act, if anywhere?
(Circle as
many as apply.)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Oral communication with the client
Management letter
Footnotes to the financial statements
Compliance report
Opinion on the financial statements

Do you think another governmental auditor might make a
different reporting decision?
YES

NO

UNSURE

If you answered YES or UNSURE, where do you believe
another auditor would report noncompliance?
(Circle as
many as apply.)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Oral communication with the client
Management letter
Footnotes to the financial statements
Compliance report
Opinion on the financial statements
No communication
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SAMPLE CASE B

In auditing for compliance with the Louisiana Local
Government Budget Act, you have discovered that Pemberton
EXCEEDED its budgeted General Fund expenditures BY 7%
WITHOUT AMENDING THE BUDGET.
You have determined that two years ago, a MAJOR
EMPLOYER in the area CLOSED.
Indications are that this
closure has led to REDUCED LOCAL SPENDING and a SERIOUS
EROSION IN SALES TAX REVENUES.
The MAYOR of this town is a POPULAR INCUMBENT serving
his third term.
a*a

a*a

a*a

a*a

a*a

a*a

a*a

a*a

a*a

a*a

In light of the information you have, would you report
noncompliance with the Local Government Budget Act?
YES

NO

If you answered YES, where would you report
noncompliance with the Budget Act, if anywhere?
(Circle as
many as apply.)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Oral communication with the client
Management letter
Footnotes to the financial statements
Compliance report
Opinion on the financial statements

Do you think another governmental auditor might make a
different reporting decision?
YES

NO

UNSURE

If you answered YES or UNSURE, where do you believe
another auditor would report noncompliance?
(Circle as
many as apply.)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Oral communication with the client
Management letter
Footnotes to the financial statements
Compliance report
Opinion on the financial statements
No communication
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SAMPLE CASE C

You have determined that two years ago, a MAJOR
EMPLOYER in the area CLOSED.
Indications are that this
closure has led to REDUCED LOCAL SPENDING and a SERIOUS
EROSION IN SALES TAX REVENUES.
During the year for which you are auditing the
financial statements, the voters of Pemberton elected a NEW
MAYOR who defeated the incumbent in a HIGHLY COMPETITIVE
ELECTION.
In auditing for compliance with the Louisiana Local
Government Budget Act, you have discovered that Pemberton
EXCEEDED its budgeted General Fund expenditures BY 16%
WITHOUT AMENDING THE BUDGET.
A*A

A*A

A* A

A*A

A* A

A*A

A* A

A*A

A*A

A* A

In light of the information you have, would you report
noncompliance with the Local Government Budget Act?
YES

NO

If you answered YES, where would you report
noncompliance with the Budget Act, if anywhere?
(Circle as
many as apply.)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Oral communication with the client
Management letter
Footnotes to the financial statements
Compliance report
Opinion on the financial statements

Do you think another governmental auditor might make a
different reporting decision?
YES

NO

UNSURE

If you answered YES or UNSURE, where do you believe
another auditor would report noncompliance?
(Circle as
many as apply.)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Oral communication with the client
Management letter
Footnotes to the financial statements
Compliance report
Opinion on the financial statements
No communication
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